February 15, 2009
Human Rights Activist Dies in Buffalo Plane Crash
As we continue to find out more about those who perished when Continental Flight 3407 crashed near Buffalo, New York, on Thursday night, yesterday's New York Times reported that Dr. Alison Des Forges, a human rights activist and historian who in 1994 tried to call the world's attention to the looming genocide in Rwanda and who later wrote what many consider the definitive account of the eventual slaughter of 500,000 Rwandans, was among the passengers on that plane. Dr. Des Forges was 66.
According to the Times report, her death was confirmed by Human Rights Watch, the New York-based advocacy group; Dr. Des Forges was senior adviser for the group's Africa division for nearly 20 years.
Dr. Des Forges (pronounced deh-FORZH) spent much of her adult life in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region of Africa. She was among a group of activists who investigated killings, kidnappings and other rights abuses of civilians in Rwanda from 1990 to 1993.
The Times story continues:
In May 1994, several weeks into the mass killing of Rwanda’s Tutsi minority, Dr. Des Forges called for the killings to be officially declared a genocide. By then about 200,000 people had been killed.
“Governments hesitate to call the horror by its name,” Dr. Des Forges wrote in The New York Times, “for to do so would oblige them to act: signatories to the Convention for the Prevention of Genocide, including the United States, are legally bound to ‘prevent and punish’ it.”
Peacekeepers should be sent into the country and economic sanctions imposed, Dr. Des Forges said, concluding, “Can we do anything less in the face of genocide, no matter what name we give it?”
After a Tutsi-led rebel group took power after ending the killings, Dr. Des Forges spent four years interviewing organizers and victims of the genocide. She testified before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, based in Arusha, Tanzania, and at trials in Belgium, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada. She also appeared on expert panels convened by the United Nations and what is now the African Union, as well as the French and Belgian legislatures and the United States Congress.
According to the Times, Dr. Des Forges was also an authority on human rights violations in Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, formerly Zaire.
Dr. Des Forges is survived by her husband, Roger; one daughter, Jessie; a son, Alexander; a brother, Douglas Small Liebhafsky; and three grandchildren. They -- and the rest of the world -- have lost someone special.
Saturday, February 28, 2009
Friday, February 27, 2009
Durkheim/Dreyfus Affair/Anti-Semitism/France's Third Republic/Public Sentiment and Political Action
Simply taking notes at this point.
Durkheim appears to take the following viewpoint, and please forgive the order of thoughts...
1. Durkheim, in his explanation of Anti-Semitism in France in the late 19th century, posited that France's moral and social conditions exhibited a diminished degree of social solidarity; a feeling of international embarrassment and inadequacy due to at least two significant military defeats in the prior40 years; an evolving division of labor without a full capacity to integrate all participants into the social fabric; a corresponding rise of militarism; a foul economy; creating a condition of moral and social deprivation keen in the development of Anti-Semitic feelings, attitudes, and behavior of an extreme emotional nature. These factored into a state of anomie, begetting a need for a scapegoat, in this case, Jews. The Dreyfus Affair demonstrated France's torn, social fabric; as two sides engaged in a military criminal court battle lasting 12 years, involving a Jewish Army Captain (Dreyfus), several general and field Army officers, espionage, conspiracy, four convictions of three different individuals (one whom fled the country to avoid imprisonment), community activists and intellectuals, government officials outside the military, politicians, journalists, and had the affect of separating the country into two distinct and opposing segments across the country.
2. Social Solidarity plays an important role in its development, maintenance, amelioration, and elimination of Anti-Semitism. To eliminate a burgeoning, growing or even pervasive Anti-Semitic attitude in a society, social solidarity must be restored and anomie appreciably diminished. Durkheim, taking a Functionalist's point of view, observed that Anti-Semitism proved to re-establish social order within France "by designating the Jew as adversary, it restored social solidarity, uniting society around hatred of the Jew” (Birnbaum 1995: Ch. 6: p. 20). Once again, what is seen and described as dysfunctional is in another sense a functional response to a dysfunction.
3. Durkheim maintained that France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was extremely debilitating for the French peoples' international and accordingly self-esteem. This gave rise to a perceived need to avenge this defeat and a concomitant rise in militarism in France. The military was glorified and soon had a significant voice in state policy. Durkheim viewed this as one of many "disturbances of a collective order", and how these may lead to societal anomie, and to a "social malaise", which in this instance was personified by Anti-Semitic behavior and attitudes. Anomie, according to Durkheim, set in.
4. Once again, Durkheim's explanation for Anti-Semitism has a building-block quality to it and therefore increases its credibility. Please take a moment and think about his observations in today's world; his advocacy for certain ideals; and how these ideals correlate with a functional state of social solidarity in an organic and well-developed division of labor. (The key is the division of labor.) However, I must add a variable to this explanation. Durkheim posited that non-economic phenomena (i.e. a significant "catastrophe" having expansive, social impact with a resultant collective response) could create conditions for Anti-Semitism and other distorted responses without a rational foundation. Given our global society, the stability created by a well-developed division of labor and its correlative social structure, may not be reasonably attained. However, let's take a look some of his salient thoughts.
He advocated for: (a) equal justice for all; (b) equal opportunity for all; and (c) the growth and development of the individual as an ideal in the context of work and the social order, including fair treatment within law, more especially restitutive law in a predominantly organic environment. If these ideals are adhered to, a viable division of labor and social connectivity are realized within which all persons are actively involved; social solidarity is intact; and social ills, including anomie, are non-existent.
5. Are present-day disenfranchised and/or minority groups in some societies potentially in the same predicament? When anomie arises in a society, is it possible that such groups become scapegoats? Is a "deficient" division of labor without Durkheim's ideals the cause of the social ill?
6. The more equal opportunity for individualized growth within a society, based upon the potential one should experience within work (i.e. within a storng, extensive, and vibrant division of labor), the greater the social solidarity within an organically-oriented society.
7. Has the U.S. suffered a degree of anomie at certain points in time and responded as the French did in the 1890s into the 20th century? Does its social and political fabric remain, to some degree, in this mode? Do other countries suffer for the same reason? Does the dominant culture within the U.S., in times of extreme crisis, point to groups of individuals as the cause of the problem (e.g. Muslims after 9/11/2001 or immigrants from Ireland {19th Century} or Mexico {late 20th and present-day}). Did the country's citizenry "rally around the flag" against an "evilized" group in each case? If so, was the scapegoating only a sign or indicator of a greater social ill? Would Durkheim, if these are a reasonable examples, maintain that there is an inadequacy inherent to the U.S. division of labor? Is there equality? Is the ideal of individualism with equal rights and privileges borne out in practice? Are some left out of the economic and social systems? Is the widening gap between the poor and the rich a sufficient social ill to correlate with another variables to explain irrational behavior and attitudes? Are we involved in class warfare? Are these questions that should focus on the U.S. division of labor, or should we consider the rest of the world, given our reliance upon the rest of the world and its governments for survival? If so, what changes can or should be made?
Got to go. Have a good weekend.
Durkheim appears to take the following viewpoint, and please forgive the order of thoughts...
1. Durkheim, in his explanation of Anti-Semitism in France in the late 19th century, posited that France's moral and social conditions exhibited a diminished degree of social solidarity; a feeling of international embarrassment and inadequacy due to at least two significant military defeats in the prior40 years; an evolving division of labor without a full capacity to integrate all participants into the social fabric; a corresponding rise of militarism; a foul economy; creating a condition of moral and social deprivation keen in the development of Anti-Semitic feelings, attitudes, and behavior of an extreme emotional nature. These factored into a state of anomie, begetting a need for a scapegoat, in this case, Jews. The Dreyfus Affair demonstrated France's torn, social fabric; as two sides engaged in a military criminal court battle lasting 12 years, involving a Jewish Army Captain (Dreyfus), several general and field Army officers, espionage, conspiracy, four convictions of three different individuals (one whom fled the country to avoid imprisonment), community activists and intellectuals, government officials outside the military, politicians, journalists, and had the affect of separating the country into two distinct and opposing segments across the country.
2. Social Solidarity plays an important role in its development, maintenance, amelioration, and elimination of Anti-Semitism. To eliminate a burgeoning, growing or even pervasive Anti-Semitic attitude in a society, social solidarity must be restored and anomie appreciably diminished. Durkheim, taking a Functionalist's point of view, observed that Anti-Semitism proved to re-establish social order within France "by designating the Jew as adversary, it restored social solidarity, uniting society around hatred of the Jew” (Birnbaum 1995: Ch. 6: p. 20). Once again, what is seen and described as dysfunctional is in another sense a functional response to a dysfunction.
3. Durkheim maintained that France's defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 was extremely debilitating for the French peoples' international and accordingly self-esteem. This gave rise to a perceived need to avenge this defeat and a concomitant rise in militarism in France. The military was glorified and soon had a significant voice in state policy. Durkheim viewed this as one of many "disturbances of a collective order", and how these may lead to societal anomie, and to a "social malaise", which in this instance was personified by Anti-Semitic behavior and attitudes. Anomie, according to Durkheim, set in.
4. Once again, Durkheim's explanation for Anti-Semitism has a building-block quality to it and therefore increases its credibility. Please take a moment and think about his observations in today's world; his advocacy for certain ideals; and how these ideals correlate with a functional state of social solidarity in an organic and well-developed division of labor. (The key is the division of labor.) However, I must add a variable to this explanation. Durkheim posited that non-economic phenomena (i.e. a significant "catastrophe" having expansive, social impact with a resultant collective response) could create conditions for Anti-Semitism and other distorted responses without a rational foundation. Given our global society, the stability created by a well-developed division of labor and its correlative social structure, may not be reasonably attained. However, let's take a look some of his salient thoughts.
He advocated for: (a) equal justice for all; (b) equal opportunity for all; and (c) the growth and development of the individual as an ideal in the context of work and the social order, including fair treatment within law, more especially restitutive law in a predominantly organic environment. If these ideals are adhered to, a viable division of labor and social connectivity are realized within which all persons are actively involved; social solidarity is intact; and social ills, including anomie, are non-existent.
5. Are present-day disenfranchised and/or minority groups in some societies potentially in the same predicament? When anomie arises in a society, is it possible that such groups become scapegoats? Is a "deficient" division of labor without Durkheim's ideals the cause of the social ill?
6. The more equal opportunity for individualized growth within a society, based upon the potential one should experience within work (i.e. within a storng, extensive, and vibrant division of labor), the greater the social solidarity within an organically-oriented society.
7. Has the U.S. suffered a degree of anomie at certain points in time and responded as the French did in the 1890s into the 20th century? Does its social and political fabric remain, to some degree, in this mode? Do other countries suffer for the same reason? Does the dominant culture within the U.S., in times of extreme crisis, point to groups of individuals as the cause of the problem (e.g. Muslims after 9/11/2001 or immigrants from Ireland {19th Century} or Mexico {late 20th and present-day}). Did the country's citizenry "rally around the flag" against an "evilized" group in each case? If so, was the scapegoating only a sign or indicator of a greater social ill? Would Durkheim, if these are a reasonable examples, maintain that there is an inadequacy inherent to the U.S. division of labor? Is there equality? Is the ideal of individualism with equal rights and privileges borne out in practice? Are some left out of the economic and social systems? Is the widening gap between the poor and the rich a sufficient social ill to correlate with another variables to explain irrational behavior and attitudes? Are we involved in class warfare? Are these questions that should focus on the U.S. division of labor, or should we consider the rest of the world, given our reliance upon the rest of the world and its governments for survival? If so, what changes can or should be made?
Got to go. Have a good weekend.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
Durkheim - Organic Solidarity and Contractual Solidarity
Durkheim has written and I am intrigued by the following: "We must indeed not forget that if life is more regulated it is also generally more abundant." Regulated by the number of restitutive laws, or the complexity of these laws, in response to greater social complexities? If I consider what I have experienced in the past 40 years, then I must answer yes to both.
Consider the following: The Iowa Administrative Code Index alone is at present 638 pages; the Code and Index are updated bi-weekly on its website; there is a permanent Administrative Rules Review Committee in the Iowa State legislature; the LSA (Legislative Services Agency) analyzes the fiscal impact of all administrative rules with a potential impact of $100,000 or more; there are uniform rules on agency procedure; and statutes focused on State Sovereignty and Management, Elections and Official Duties, Public Services and Regulation, Public Health, Agriculture, Human Services, Education and Cultural Affairs, Transportation, Local Government, Financial Resources, Natural Resources, Business Entities, Commerce, Property, Judicial Branch and Judicial Proceedings, Criminal Law and Procedures, Mortality Tables, Historical Chronological Outline of Codes and Session Laws, Iowa-Missouri Boundary Compromise, Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compromise, and Admission of Iowa into the Union statutes providing guidance within the Iowa Administrative Rules section; and another approximately 100 sections governing activities ranging from the Beef Industry to banking, to interior design, to utilities, to real estate, to professional licensing, and many more in the Iowa Administrative Code.
But how does this complexity and great delineation of obligations, and therefore social interaction and relationships, beget greater "life abundance"? Did I just answer my own question, or not? As restitutive law increases, producing more regulation, does it inherently govern as well as increase the number of interactions and relationships, the complexity of these interactions and relationships, and therefore, the types of interactions and relationships, going far beyond the exchange of goods and services? Durkheim suggests that the proliferation of restitutive law in fact "defines and regulates" the "special relationship" between the "different social functions". It appears that Durkheim's theory may have credibility. As persons become more individualized by division of labor, their reliance upon one another increases, reliance has now has evolved to an issue of survival, whether we speak of health care, transportation, child care, shelter (e.g. if a furnace is not maintained by a specialist, death could result), and beyond. These specializations are governed by innumerable restitutive laws. A social network beyond the vocational connectivity between people results, as we now become more involved with one another in a variety of additional roles. How many of us, have been asked to be a part of a Board of Directors, a committee, a fraternal organization, a team, a club, a partnership, or simply invited to an event, etc. as a result of our vocational specialization? All of us have been and will continue to be a part of one another's reality due to the division of labor, the specialization, and the organic solidarity.
Nevertheless, we must also examine the quantitative status of repressive law vis-a-vis restitutive law to come to an accurate conclusion regarding which type may predominantly define and categorize our individual and social reality and type of social solidarity (i.e. of course, mechanical or organic) in our society. I also theorize that each individual is effected differently by her/his environment, and the dominant type of social solidarity may have less or greater impact on each person by virtue of a variety of individualized circumstances. These circumstances include the type of job s/he holds. Yes, the dominant restitutive law environment will impact each person differently, and in broad strokes, may impact those in lesser skilled jobs differently. Of course, these jobs require less specialization. So, logically the impact of an organic environment may have less impact on these persons. This circumstance, along with other variables, may in fact create a greater amount of mechanical solidarity among individuals in this circumstance, with the critical aspect of the collective consciousness coming to the forefront. Accordingly, other variables, all associated with the foundational division of labor, may correlate with a greater collective consciousness and greater mechanical solidarity. Perhaps an alignment of a few or several variables is necessary for the triumph of mechanical over organic in a predominantly organic society. In economically deprived areas, some with a strong allegiance to tradition and organized religion, along with the prerequisite simple division of labor, one might find a mechanical orientation. Of course, the key is, the division of labor. This may not surprise anyone. A simple division of labor circumstance (perhaps isolated in time and location) can be associated with unskilled or under skilled positions, perhaps sporadic employment or unemployment, and low wages. Physical isolation may or may not be a part of the equation, caused by quite a few variables, but reinforced by transportation challenges and diminished access to services and opportunity for change and information. Does this lead to greater isolation, even from those in similar circumstances? In some cases, yes. In others, no. It will depend upon the geographic proximity of "fellow-sufferers". If close by, the social isolation can be diminished within the "fellow-sufferers" domain, but remains vis-a-vis dissimilar groups of persons. This reinforces mechanical solidarity in an organic solidarity environment. If there is commonality in suffering; close geographic proximity; and a slow-changing environment; there is possibly a greater adherence to tradition and a potentially greater reliance upon a greater power that ordains and controls persons' destiny (the locus of control is not within the individual for outside forces have dictated the condition for long periods of time, even generations). Some persons and families may relate to the environment as "caught or stuck" between both worlds, the mechanical and organic, even though there is a dominant type of solidarity that is still creating individuality (organic) and social circles (both types) for all. This "caught or stuck" status is exemplified by a distinct array of coping mechanisms displaying both mechanical and organic solidarity traits that may not be found in the same proportion in other persons. It has been advanced that the importance of relying on others to survive in an organic environment is a critical coping mechanism for all, as a result of the development of the division of labor, specialization, and their by-product, individuality. In contrast, the same holds true in a mechanical solidarity environment, but for different reasons. I advance the thought that in some sectors of a predominantly organic solidarity environment, we will find a greater proportion of mechanical solidarity traits, behaviors, and attitudes. These attitudes and behaviors will be produced in response to a different set of environmental factors that include less reliance on restitutive law given a dearth of complexity in the environment these sectors come into contact. Restitutive law does have some influence in these sectors, but there is simply less of a need for it. These mechanically-based attitudes and behaviors will be reasonable and functional in application, are related to survival (not hyperbole), stem from a localized division of labor factor, are produced independent of the societally-dominant organic forces that may actually be detrimental to these persons if the organic orientation is practiced and accepted; are generational; and are differentially open to change or alteration as practical. With respect to consciousness, for this segment of the population, the ratio of individual consicousness to group or collective consciousness is different that the rest of the population. There is more collective consciousness out of perceived and actual necessity, despite the rest of the population "dancing to the beat of a different drum"; that beat being organic solidarity derived.
Taking a break.
Consider the following: The Iowa Administrative Code Index alone is at present 638 pages; the Code and Index are updated bi-weekly on its website; there is a permanent Administrative Rules Review Committee in the Iowa State legislature; the LSA (Legislative Services Agency) analyzes the fiscal impact of all administrative rules with a potential impact of $100,000 or more; there are uniform rules on agency procedure; and statutes focused on State Sovereignty and Management, Elections and Official Duties, Public Services and Regulation, Public Health, Agriculture, Human Services, Education and Cultural Affairs, Transportation, Local Government, Financial Resources, Natural Resources, Business Entities, Commerce, Property, Judicial Branch and Judicial Proceedings, Criminal Law and Procedures, Mortality Tables, Historical Chronological Outline of Codes and Session Laws, Iowa-Missouri Boundary Compromise, Iowa-Nebraska Boundary Compromise, and Admission of Iowa into the Union statutes providing guidance within the Iowa Administrative Rules section; and another approximately 100 sections governing activities ranging from the Beef Industry to banking, to interior design, to utilities, to real estate, to professional licensing, and many more in the Iowa Administrative Code.
But how does this complexity and great delineation of obligations, and therefore social interaction and relationships, beget greater "life abundance"? Did I just answer my own question, or not? As restitutive law increases, producing more regulation, does it inherently govern as well as increase the number of interactions and relationships, the complexity of these interactions and relationships, and therefore, the types of interactions and relationships, going far beyond the exchange of goods and services? Durkheim suggests that the proliferation of restitutive law in fact "defines and regulates" the "special relationship" between the "different social functions". It appears that Durkheim's theory may have credibility. As persons become more individualized by division of labor, their reliance upon one another increases, reliance has now has evolved to an issue of survival, whether we speak of health care, transportation, child care, shelter (e.g. if a furnace is not maintained by a specialist, death could result), and beyond. These specializations are governed by innumerable restitutive laws. A social network beyond the vocational connectivity between people results, as we now become more involved with one another in a variety of additional roles. How many of us, have been asked to be a part of a Board of Directors, a committee, a fraternal organization, a team, a club, a partnership, or simply invited to an event, etc. as a result of our vocational specialization? All of us have been and will continue to be a part of one another's reality due to the division of labor, the specialization, and the organic solidarity.
Nevertheless, we must also examine the quantitative status of repressive law vis-a-vis restitutive law to come to an accurate conclusion regarding which type may predominantly define and categorize our individual and social reality and type of social solidarity (i.e. of course, mechanical or organic) in our society. I also theorize that each individual is effected differently by her/his environment, and the dominant type of social solidarity may have less or greater impact on each person by virtue of a variety of individualized circumstances. These circumstances include the type of job s/he holds. Yes, the dominant restitutive law environment will impact each person differently, and in broad strokes, may impact those in lesser skilled jobs differently. Of course, these jobs require less specialization. So, logically the impact of an organic environment may have less impact on these persons. This circumstance, along with other variables, may in fact create a greater amount of mechanical solidarity among individuals in this circumstance, with the critical aspect of the collective consciousness coming to the forefront. Accordingly, other variables, all associated with the foundational division of labor, may correlate with a greater collective consciousness and greater mechanical solidarity. Perhaps an alignment of a few or several variables is necessary for the triumph of mechanical over organic in a predominantly organic society. In economically deprived areas, some with a strong allegiance to tradition and organized religion, along with the prerequisite simple division of labor, one might find a mechanical orientation. Of course, the key is, the division of labor. This may not surprise anyone. A simple division of labor circumstance (perhaps isolated in time and location) can be associated with unskilled or under skilled positions, perhaps sporadic employment or unemployment, and low wages. Physical isolation may or may not be a part of the equation, caused by quite a few variables, but reinforced by transportation challenges and diminished access to services and opportunity for change and information. Does this lead to greater isolation, even from those in similar circumstances? In some cases, yes. In others, no. It will depend upon the geographic proximity of "fellow-sufferers". If close by, the social isolation can be diminished within the "fellow-sufferers" domain, but remains vis-a-vis dissimilar groups of persons. This reinforces mechanical solidarity in an organic solidarity environment. If there is commonality in suffering; close geographic proximity; and a slow-changing environment; there is possibly a greater adherence to tradition and a potentially greater reliance upon a greater power that ordains and controls persons' destiny (the locus of control is not within the individual for outside forces have dictated the condition for long periods of time, even generations). Some persons and families may relate to the environment as "caught or stuck" between both worlds, the mechanical and organic, even though there is a dominant type of solidarity that is still creating individuality (organic) and social circles (both types) for all. This "caught or stuck" status is exemplified by a distinct array of coping mechanisms displaying both mechanical and organic solidarity traits that may not be found in the same proportion in other persons. It has been advanced that the importance of relying on others to survive in an organic environment is a critical coping mechanism for all, as a result of the development of the division of labor, specialization, and their by-product, individuality. In contrast, the same holds true in a mechanical solidarity environment, but for different reasons. I advance the thought that in some sectors of a predominantly organic solidarity environment, we will find a greater proportion of mechanical solidarity traits, behaviors, and attitudes. These attitudes and behaviors will be produced in response to a different set of environmental factors that include less reliance on restitutive law given a dearth of complexity in the environment these sectors come into contact. Restitutive law does have some influence in these sectors, but there is simply less of a need for it. These mechanically-based attitudes and behaviors will be reasonable and functional in application, are related to survival (not hyperbole), stem from a localized division of labor factor, are produced independent of the societally-dominant organic forces that may actually be detrimental to these persons if the organic orientation is practiced and accepted; are generational; and are differentially open to change or alteration as practical. With respect to consciousness, for this segment of the population, the ratio of individual consicousness to group or collective consciousness is different that the rest of the population. There is more collective consciousness out of perceived and actual necessity, despite the rest of the population "dancing to the beat of a different drum"; that beat being organic solidarity derived.
Taking a break.
Monday, February 23, 2009
Durkheim
How is Restitutive Law the external evidence of organic solidarity?As I review this blog entry, submitted and retracted last week, I find the task of answering this question quite daunting. How could this be? Simply because one needs to analyze Durkheim’s entire book The Division of Labor in Society, reading it not just once (my reality), and then attempt to capture what took him approximately 350 pages to elucidate in a cogent manner within a respectable amount of time. I foolishly read for two days, felt confident, and wrote a reasonable explanation. Or so I thought. However, as I continued to read others’ interpretations, I felt more than a bit uneasy. So, I began reading what was once read and added a few more readings. So, with this in mind, I shall commence writing.
Within organic solidarity, Durkheim believed that the individual becomes...well, more individual, while more connected to others via specialization in accordance with a greater division of labor. Durkheim explained that he must have an objective measure for us to understand and measure social solidarity accurately. He relied upon types of law for this explanation, dividing law into two arenas: repressive and restitutive. Another author mentioned in his writings that Durkheim used this measuring tool since it would be difficult to measure social solidarity internally (i.e. on an individual and psychological basis). If I remember correctly, Durkheim stated this in a different manner, and also contended that social solidarity held psychological and social dimensions. Of course, Durkheim is right. If social solidarity is not felt in the individual’s mind, then how can it be constructed and maintained across a particular society?
Before I go any further, I have to separate restitutive and repressive law along one dimension or I’ll lose the thought. Durkheim stipulates that repressive law has a specific behavior correlated with a specific punishment, whereas restitutive law may have a specific behavior or condition between two entities (i.e. it may not be an individual against the State as found within the guidance provided in repressive or criminal law) without a specific punishment. When I use the term “specific” I mean the behavior and the punishment are in written form and each “crime” is defined precisely in a code promulgated and disseminated appropriately to the population just as each corresponding punishment is also defined precisely in same code. If constructed accurately in accordance with intent (e.g. legislative), judicial decisions will reflect without deviation the punishment called for each crime. It is of course true that some laws are written with some discretionary judicial latitude allowed, however, even these available options have boundaries for the judicial branch decision. Restitutive law is not concerned with punishment, rather with reinstating the status quo or placing the pieces back the way they were, so to speak; restoring the greater, social equilibrium. Yes, private parties are involved, but the intent and practice goes far beyond the individuals involved. Second, it has an administrative nature to it, and has greater discretionary power attributed to the administrator. It is interesting that the State of Iowa has constructed a position within state government, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), that serves as a representative of both repressive and restitutive law, depending upon function. I served as an Administrative Law Judge in a prison for several years, and my decisional options may have been varied and expansive, but these were almost all repressive in that punishment was the result. (Naturally, punishment is not the only aspect to repressive law. However, it is noteworthy that some of the other aspects of repressive law seem to fit quite nicely {perhaps an odd term to use, yet quite appropriate in one sense}, such as the nature of the division of labor in a prison setting.) Of course, the punishments were not for revenge, but to alter behavior and provide for a safe environment for others. This is not to say that either goal was achieved or not achieved in each instance. However, I bring this up to point out that the use of the term Administrative in this case in a misnomer. I shall mention that it appears that most ALJs in the State of Iowa are involved in restitutive law, attempting to re-establish the status quo for the common good as well as to address the needs of those immediately involved.
The discretionary aspect is perceived as necessary given the individuality inherent to each circumstance or “case” in a restitutive environment. Of course, repressive law proceedings will involve complexities and individuality, but the fact that there is a sentencing phase bears out a distinctive quality from restitutive law. The administrative decision, which includes remedies instead of punishments, requires that all options and remedies be “on the table” and open as potential sources for redress. In this instance, the “judge” is not statutorily limited as one can be in repressive or criminal law in the meting out of punishment.
In addition, Durkheim distinguishes these laws by maintaining that repressive laws are proscriptive, stating behavior that is contrary to the common good and its correlative punishment; whereas restitutive laws stipulate “obligations”, setting out behavior that is engaged in between people and their social and business constructs and contracts. For instance, a marriage is set in motion by a legal contract (obviously not common law marriage, allowable in approximately 10 states in the U.S.), stipulating legal, contractual obligations, not what is contrary to the agreement with associated punishments for transgressions. I presume, if Durkheim is correct in today’s world, the same holds true for any contractual agreement. In working with a variety of agencies, public and private, over the years, and coming into contractual agreements, it appears that Durkheim’s assessment remains accurate. I have worked for many years under contract with many governmental agencies, and these contracts spoke to activities each agency agreed to engage in with stated objectives, outputs, and most importantly, outcomes for the community. Proscriptions for behavior that raised the ire of the “collective consciousness”, as Durkheim stipulated as perhaps one of two key components of repressive law (punishment as the other) did not exist within these contracts. No “deviant” (this term is not used to explain “criminal” acts since the term within this usage needs to explain all activity that simply deviates from the contract) behavior was mentioned as part of the contract, nor punishment.
Studying law within a society is measurable since it is codified. It is “visible” (Durkheim). Codification implies written form. Codification implies a social process has been undertaken by a society, imperfect as it may be. Codification implies an evolutionary process. Evolution implies a social consciousness that allows for “movement” in how a social attitude is personified; from the unwritten but pervasive, such as a custom, to the written and still pervasive, now a law. Can researchers study types of law in certain societies and extrapolate types of social solidarity? Durkheim states that to be certain of establishing the accuracy of social solidarity, the sanction associated with the law, whether restitutive or repressive, must be studied. The former is represented by a restorative justice model, returning social order to disorder. The later is punitive and represented by the infliction of injury to the perpetrator. Durkheim also points out the degree of emotion related to each type of law. Repressive law exudes emotion; a product of many societal attributes. Restitutive law begetting a more diffuse and obscure response.
Durkheim postulated that the more mechanical (i.e. simple) society will display: (1) a simple and less expansive division of labor; (2) greater similarity between people, their “worldview”, work-place skill levels, language, and social relationships; (3) greater “collective or common consciousness” development, usage, and punitive control; (4) a greater reliance upon tradition and religion to explain its origin and present-day viability; (5) a personality type that is “dependent on the collective” and weaker than the group personality type since group consciousness is necessary to control and guide individual behavior and the greater and stronger the uniqueness of character, the greater the differences between group members, and the weaker the strength of the “collective consciousness” to provide social solidarity within the society (i.e. the greater the collective consciousness the greater the mechanical solidarity); and (6) the use of punishment and fear (i.e. includes the importance of vengeance and the need to “circle the wagons” when an act threatens the common good), via repressive law.
Durkheim concludes mechanical solidarity ( and for that matter, organic solidarity) is a label or construct describing a type of social consciousness (including how relationships and order are achieved) explained via type of division of labor and determined by an examination of the dominant type of law in a society. Durkheim maintains mechanical solidarity societies are a result of a limited division of labor and a common consciousness and the use of repressive law as an instrument to maintain the solidarity. The limited division of labor inherently creates similarities and closeness. This, along with aforementioned factors translates into the cohesive social environment. In contrast, in an organic environment, the distinctions between persons lead to solidarity, but not through the same avenue; the “feelings” (e.g. in an absolute sense there is a feeling of “collective consciousness”, a societal mind-set in the mechanical, and a feeling for independence through the establishment/maintenance of boundaries through contractual agreements within the organic) created are different, and the mode of solidarity creation and maintenance is distinct as seen in the type of law relied upon. The distinctive feelings are a product of dependence (mechanical) and independence (organic) solidarity factors. Durkheim noted that Comte saw that the characteristics of the division of labor did not just generate a distinct form of economic mode of operation, instead, it generates “the most essential condition of social life”. Therefore, the division of labor dictates how we respond socially (i.e. “social order, harmony, and solidarity), both formally (e.g. restitutive versus repressive law) and informally (e.g. customs or “collective consciousness) (Durkheim). Law exemplifies this organization and accomplishes this with acuity and permanence.
In greater detail we find that Durkheim believed that penal law emanated from our Judeo-Christian religion foundation. All penal laws emanate from religion and God. Guidance from the Bible includes proscribed actions and punishments. God holds the highest authority “status” for the “collective consciousness” of the mechanical solidarity society. God is superior to all. To break a penal law is to violate the highest of all authority. The “collective consciousness”, found in a mechanical society, holds true to repressive laws with punishments and must protect its unity for social solidarity to survive. A transgression begetting “collective consciousness” ire (i.e. includes emotion) is a transgression against the highest authority.
Perhaps a good starting point to explain organic solidarity is with individuality. And, I can’t miss this Durkheimian point as he begins to explain how organic solidarity arises: “That individuality cannot arise until the community fills us less completely” (The Division of Labor in Society). Durkheim, logically follows with (paraphrasing): “If we have a strong inclination to think and act as ourselves, then we will obviously not think and act in a “group-like” manner”. He, I believe, then alludes to our individual psycho-social makeup, when he mentions that our “image”, and I am going to integrate self-esteem and social-social esteem, becomes a key point of development in an organic solidarity environment. When this occurs, and obviously Durkheim relates this morphological process to an increased division of labor within an organic solidarity environment, we, as individuals, move from a “collective being” to more of an individualized being. Next, solidarity ensues differently as the division of labor changes and individuals assume distant roles and duties in the workplace. As the individual assumes a workplace identity with distinct duties, individuality increases...a “personality” is formed. The greater the division (and specialization), the greater the reliance upon the greater social environment or society, as others specifically and others in general are needed to fill the gaps created by distinctions in work and outside of work. So, the personality grows as the work is divided, and as the personality grows through specialization in the workplace, interdependence increases along all other social dimensions, creating a distinct social solidarity that carries with it different needs, including a different type of cementing structure, to wit: restitutive law, with greater reliance upon cooperation and not conflict and separation found in punishment (e.g. prison, transportation, social degradation, death, and/or additional incarceration in secure settings after prison sentence culmination). (The idea of/with punishment is partially if not predominantly to find separation, fault, differences, illness or sickness (i.e. medical model), or moral deficiencies of the deepest nature between people in the absence of logic found in economic, political, sociological, and legal explanations.)
Durkheim notes that with individual development, we remain connected with one another through professional or vocational guidelines and standards. Therefore, the greater community remains a part of our individual conscious. It is not lost. It grows as each grows as the division of labor grows. This is the growth of organic solidarity as it replaces mechanical solidarity in that specific society. Durkheim equates this social development to the biological development of a species. As the species evolves, it requires greater division of function by body part (i.e. whether organ, limb, or sensate focus apparatus) to exist; from this analogy, Durkheim labels the social solidarity “organic”.
The use of a combination of these two types of law is commonplace across the globe. Within a mechanical solidarity environment individualism is impractical for the development of social solidarity. A collective consciousness dominates and controls. Within organic solidarity, the individual rises to the surface, and persons' activities and thoughts become complementary. When greater division of labor occurs, there is a corresponding change, and each type of law may be represented to a certain degree within a society. Time is a relevant variable in this change as well. Repressive law dominance is found in “lower” and slower developing societies, according to Durkheim. He maintains that unless a mechanical society is forced into change through the greater division of labor, all things move more slowly, tradition is dominant, the “common consciousness” remains strong and slow to change, repressive or criminal law does not change appreciably (few laws are added over time), and repressive law is so well engrained in the public psyche it is independent of the individual citizen’s life-circumstances…it is a part of the culture, a collective, intergenerational, psychological and social mind-set.
It is noteworthy that Dirkheim points out that authority, such as the State, may perceive crimes against it as more serious than the collective consciousness, and will take action as it sees fit. The authority receives power from the collective consciousness, yet takes on a separate role with “autonomy and spontaneity” (Durkheim).
Of course, Durkheim writes of a distinction between the two types of law. Repressive law is well ingrained in a specific society's social conscious; all know of the crime and the punishment; and there is a deep, emotional aversion to the behavior/crime leading to a punishment.Durkheim points out that "crimes" within a society as well as between distinct societies have an "essential resemblance". This common trait, as he describes it, is that each "strike(s) a moral consciousness of all nations". He recognizes that different behaviors represent different responses in different societies. This leads to variations in repressive law in regards to the defining of behavior as a crime or not a crime between societies and nation states. Once again, this time in his words, the "unchanging character" is not the "intrinsic properties" of the acts themselves or the corresponding punishments found in the penal codes, but in "some condition outside" the act, to wit, a "kind of antagonism" between the act and the "larger interests of society".
More later...
Within organic solidarity, Durkheim believed that the individual becomes...well, more individual, while more connected to others via specialization in accordance with a greater division of labor. Durkheim explained that he must have an objective measure for us to understand and measure social solidarity accurately. He relied upon types of law for this explanation, dividing law into two arenas: repressive and restitutive. Another author mentioned in his writings that Durkheim used this measuring tool since it would be difficult to measure social solidarity internally (i.e. on an individual and psychological basis). If I remember correctly, Durkheim stated this in a different manner, and also contended that social solidarity held psychological and social dimensions. Of course, Durkheim is right. If social solidarity is not felt in the individual’s mind, then how can it be constructed and maintained across a particular society?
Before I go any further, I have to separate restitutive and repressive law along one dimension or I’ll lose the thought. Durkheim stipulates that repressive law has a specific behavior correlated with a specific punishment, whereas restitutive law may have a specific behavior or condition between two entities (i.e. it may not be an individual against the State as found within the guidance provided in repressive or criminal law) without a specific punishment. When I use the term “specific” I mean the behavior and the punishment are in written form and each “crime” is defined precisely in a code promulgated and disseminated appropriately to the population just as each corresponding punishment is also defined precisely in same code. If constructed accurately in accordance with intent (e.g. legislative), judicial decisions will reflect without deviation the punishment called for each crime. It is of course true that some laws are written with some discretionary judicial latitude allowed, however, even these available options have boundaries for the judicial branch decision. Restitutive law is not concerned with punishment, rather with reinstating the status quo or placing the pieces back the way they were, so to speak; restoring the greater, social equilibrium. Yes, private parties are involved, but the intent and practice goes far beyond the individuals involved. Second, it has an administrative nature to it, and has greater discretionary power attributed to the administrator. It is interesting that the State of Iowa has constructed a position within state government, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), that serves as a representative of both repressive and restitutive law, depending upon function. I served as an Administrative Law Judge in a prison for several years, and my decisional options may have been varied and expansive, but these were almost all repressive in that punishment was the result. (Naturally, punishment is not the only aspect to repressive law. However, it is noteworthy that some of the other aspects of repressive law seem to fit quite nicely {perhaps an odd term to use, yet quite appropriate in one sense}, such as the nature of the division of labor in a prison setting.) Of course, the punishments were not for revenge, but to alter behavior and provide for a safe environment for others. This is not to say that either goal was achieved or not achieved in each instance. However, I bring this up to point out that the use of the term Administrative in this case in a misnomer. I shall mention that it appears that most ALJs in the State of Iowa are involved in restitutive law, attempting to re-establish the status quo for the common good as well as to address the needs of those immediately involved.
The discretionary aspect is perceived as necessary given the individuality inherent to each circumstance or “case” in a restitutive environment. Of course, repressive law proceedings will involve complexities and individuality, but the fact that there is a sentencing phase bears out a distinctive quality from restitutive law. The administrative decision, which includes remedies instead of punishments, requires that all options and remedies be “on the table” and open as potential sources for redress. In this instance, the “judge” is not statutorily limited as one can be in repressive or criminal law in the meting out of punishment.
In addition, Durkheim distinguishes these laws by maintaining that repressive laws are proscriptive, stating behavior that is contrary to the common good and its correlative punishment; whereas restitutive laws stipulate “obligations”, setting out behavior that is engaged in between people and their social and business constructs and contracts. For instance, a marriage is set in motion by a legal contract (obviously not common law marriage, allowable in approximately 10 states in the U.S.), stipulating legal, contractual obligations, not what is contrary to the agreement with associated punishments for transgressions. I presume, if Durkheim is correct in today’s world, the same holds true for any contractual agreement. In working with a variety of agencies, public and private, over the years, and coming into contractual agreements, it appears that Durkheim’s assessment remains accurate. I have worked for many years under contract with many governmental agencies, and these contracts spoke to activities each agency agreed to engage in with stated objectives, outputs, and most importantly, outcomes for the community. Proscriptions for behavior that raised the ire of the “collective consciousness”, as Durkheim stipulated as perhaps one of two key components of repressive law (punishment as the other) did not exist within these contracts. No “deviant” (this term is not used to explain “criminal” acts since the term within this usage needs to explain all activity that simply deviates from the contract) behavior was mentioned as part of the contract, nor punishment.
Studying law within a society is measurable since it is codified. It is “visible” (Durkheim). Codification implies written form. Codification implies a social process has been undertaken by a society, imperfect as it may be. Codification implies an evolutionary process. Evolution implies a social consciousness that allows for “movement” in how a social attitude is personified; from the unwritten but pervasive, such as a custom, to the written and still pervasive, now a law. Can researchers study types of law in certain societies and extrapolate types of social solidarity? Durkheim states that to be certain of establishing the accuracy of social solidarity, the sanction associated with the law, whether restitutive or repressive, must be studied. The former is represented by a restorative justice model, returning social order to disorder. The later is punitive and represented by the infliction of injury to the perpetrator. Durkheim also points out the degree of emotion related to each type of law. Repressive law exudes emotion; a product of many societal attributes. Restitutive law begetting a more diffuse and obscure response.
Durkheim postulated that the more mechanical (i.e. simple) society will display: (1) a simple and less expansive division of labor; (2) greater similarity between people, their “worldview”, work-place skill levels, language, and social relationships; (3) greater “collective or common consciousness” development, usage, and punitive control; (4) a greater reliance upon tradition and religion to explain its origin and present-day viability; (5) a personality type that is “dependent on the collective” and weaker than the group personality type since group consciousness is necessary to control and guide individual behavior and the greater and stronger the uniqueness of character, the greater the differences between group members, and the weaker the strength of the “collective consciousness” to provide social solidarity within the society (i.e. the greater the collective consciousness the greater the mechanical solidarity); and (6) the use of punishment and fear (i.e. includes the importance of vengeance and the need to “circle the wagons” when an act threatens the common good), via repressive law.
Durkheim concludes mechanical solidarity ( and for that matter, organic solidarity) is a label or construct describing a type of social consciousness (including how relationships and order are achieved) explained via type of division of labor and determined by an examination of the dominant type of law in a society. Durkheim maintains mechanical solidarity societies are a result of a limited division of labor and a common consciousness and the use of repressive law as an instrument to maintain the solidarity. The limited division of labor inherently creates similarities and closeness. This, along with aforementioned factors translates into the cohesive social environment. In contrast, in an organic environment, the distinctions between persons lead to solidarity, but not through the same avenue; the “feelings” (e.g. in an absolute sense there is a feeling of “collective consciousness”, a societal mind-set in the mechanical, and a feeling for independence through the establishment/maintenance of boundaries through contractual agreements within the organic) created are different, and the mode of solidarity creation and maintenance is distinct as seen in the type of law relied upon. The distinctive feelings are a product of dependence (mechanical) and independence (organic) solidarity factors. Durkheim noted that Comte saw that the characteristics of the division of labor did not just generate a distinct form of economic mode of operation, instead, it generates “the most essential condition of social life”. Therefore, the division of labor dictates how we respond socially (i.e. “social order, harmony, and solidarity), both formally (e.g. restitutive versus repressive law) and informally (e.g. customs or “collective consciousness) (Durkheim). Law exemplifies this organization and accomplishes this with acuity and permanence.
In greater detail we find that Durkheim believed that penal law emanated from our Judeo-Christian religion foundation. All penal laws emanate from religion and God. Guidance from the Bible includes proscribed actions and punishments. God holds the highest authority “status” for the “collective consciousness” of the mechanical solidarity society. God is superior to all. To break a penal law is to violate the highest of all authority. The “collective consciousness”, found in a mechanical society, holds true to repressive laws with punishments and must protect its unity for social solidarity to survive. A transgression begetting “collective consciousness” ire (i.e. includes emotion) is a transgression against the highest authority.
Perhaps a good starting point to explain organic solidarity is with individuality. And, I can’t miss this Durkheimian point as he begins to explain how organic solidarity arises: “That individuality cannot arise until the community fills us less completely” (The Division of Labor in Society). Durkheim, logically follows with (paraphrasing): “If we have a strong inclination to think and act as ourselves, then we will obviously not think and act in a “group-like” manner”. He, I believe, then alludes to our individual psycho-social makeup, when he mentions that our “image”, and I am going to integrate self-esteem and social-social esteem, becomes a key point of development in an organic solidarity environment. When this occurs, and obviously Durkheim relates this morphological process to an increased division of labor within an organic solidarity environment, we, as individuals, move from a “collective being” to more of an individualized being. Next, solidarity ensues differently as the division of labor changes and individuals assume distant roles and duties in the workplace. As the individual assumes a workplace identity with distinct duties, individuality increases...a “personality” is formed. The greater the division (and specialization), the greater the reliance upon the greater social environment or society, as others specifically and others in general are needed to fill the gaps created by distinctions in work and outside of work. So, the personality grows as the work is divided, and as the personality grows through specialization in the workplace, interdependence increases along all other social dimensions, creating a distinct social solidarity that carries with it different needs, including a different type of cementing structure, to wit: restitutive law, with greater reliance upon cooperation and not conflict and separation found in punishment (e.g. prison, transportation, social degradation, death, and/or additional incarceration in secure settings after prison sentence culmination). (The idea of/with punishment is partially if not predominantly to find separation, fault, differences, illness or sickness (i.e. medical model), or moral deficiencies of the deepest nature between people in the absence of logic found in economic, political, sociological, and legal explanations.)
Durkheim notes that with individual development, we remain connected with one another through professional or vocational guidelines and standards. Therefore, the greater community remains a part of our individual conscious. It is not lost. It grows as each grows as the division of labor grows. This is the growth of organic solidarity as it replaces mechanical solidarity in that specific society. Durkheim equates this social development to the biological development of a species. As the species evolves, it requires greater division of function by body part (i.e. whether organ, limb, or sensate focus apparatus) to exist; from this analogy, Durkheim labels the social solidarity “organic”.
The use of a combination of these two types of law is commonplace across the globe. Within a mechanical solidarity environment individualism is impractical for the development of social solidarity. A collective consciousness dominates and controls. Within organic solidarity, the individual rises to the surface, and persons' activities and thoughts become complementary. When greater division of labor occurs, there is a corresponding change, and each type of law may be represented to a certain degree within a society. Time is a relevant variable in this change as well. Repressive law dominance is found in “lower” and slower developing societies, according to Durkheim. He maintains that unless a mechanical society is forced into change through the greater division of labor, all things move more slowly, tradition is dominant, the “common consciousness” remains strong and slow to change, repressive or criminal law does not change appreciably (few laws are added over time), and repressive law is so well engrained in the public psyche it is independent of the individual citizen’s life-circumstances…it is a part of the culture, a collective, intergenerational, psychological and social mind-set.
It is noteworthy that Dirkheim points out that authority, such as the State, may perceive crimes against it as more serious than the collective consciousness, and will take action as it sees fit. The authority receives power from the collective consciousness, yet takes on a separate role with “autonomy and spontaneity” (Durkheim).
Of course, Durkheim writes of a distinction between the two types of law. Repressive law is well ingrained in a specific society's social conscious; all know of the crime and the punishment; and there is a deep, emotional aversion to the behavior/crime leading to a punishment.Durkheim points out that "crimes" within a society as well as between distinct societies have an "essential resemblance". This common trait, as he describes it, is that each "strike(s) a moral consciousness of all nations". He recognizes that different behaviors represent different responses in different societies. This leads to variations in repressive law in regards to the defining of behavior as a crime or not a crime between societies and nation states. Once again, this time in his words, the "unchanging character" is not the "intrinsic properties" of the acts themselves or the corresponding punishments found in the penal codes, but in "some condition outside" the act, to wit, a "kind of antagonism" between the act and the "larger interests of society".
More later...
Tuesday, February 17, 2009
John Stuart Mill, 1806-1873, was a British philosopher, a political economist, civil servant and Member of Parliament (MP). It has been stated that he may have been the most influential philosophical thinker of the 19th century in the English speaking world. His father, James Mill, a philosopher as well, along with Jeremy Bentham, educated Mill. It was James Mill’s intent to educate his son in accordance with Utilitarian thought, a Bentham construct. Upon Bentham’s and his death, James Mill expected his son to carry on the cause for Utilitarianism. With this in mind, Mill’s educational experience was rigorous and he was intentionally kept away from other children outside the immediate family. Mill actually gravitated away from Benthamite thought, emphasizing individual liberty over the needs of the nation-state. This is discussed below.
(Revised upon further research on 3/29/09.)
In 1776, within his Fragment on Government, Bentham proclaimed that law should be based in the principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number". (As somewhat of a side note, his principles on crime and punishment may be found in France's postrevolutionary Constitutent Assembly {1789} in its Declaration of the Rights of Man, as follows: "[T]he law has the right to prohitbit only actions harmful to society...The law shall inflict only such punishments as are strictly and clearly necessary...no person shall be punished except by virtue of a law enacted and promulgated previous to the crime and applicable to its terms.") (Criminology: Theories, Patterns, and Typologies. Nineth Edition. Siegel, Larry. Thomson Wadsworth. 2007.) A segment of this is incorporated in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, protecting (de jour, perhaps not de facto) citizens from cruel and unusual punishment (note the "and", which has been interpreted by some courts as necessary for the condition to be applied accurately in a court of law). The orientation that law should be for the majority to determine and enforce law is of course consistent with a democratic orientation and Bentham's thoughts, but inconsistent with Mill's eventual position. As mentioned at a future point within this treatise, Mill was keenly aware of the power of the "ascendant" class, and how their interests are reflected in perhaps all political, social, and familial (perhaps Comte's understanding of societies) dimensions. Mill, at the very least, spoke of this influence in law, custom, relationships, and "opinion" (Mill, J.S. On Liberty. 1869.) For instance, Mill wrote, "The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion". (Mill, J.S. On Liberty. 1869.) He noted perhaps a complacency on the part of "those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling,have left this condition of things unassailed in principle"...even if in conflict with it. (Mill, J.S. On Liberty. 1869.) Instead, Mill claimed, these avant guard (sp) thinkers focused on "what things society should like or dislike", giving up humankind's natural law of freedom for all individuals. Mill emphasized the only exceptions he observed were those inclined to defend individual, religious thought and belief, and these defenses entailed a rancorous nature. Mill continued to define the religious arguments (probably a weak description of the heated debates) in On Liberty, and saw enough of these to contend that these ended in a stalemate. This caused each side within the religious debate to realize it had gained no ground, and "seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they could not convert for permission to differ." Mill broadened these battles of beliefs and maintained these personified the greater societal battle between the rights of the individual and the stance of the state to control and subvert individual behaviors that were in opposition to its interests. Mill posited religious liberty and an individual's "freedom of conscience" was a right never to be voided by any entity, or that an individual was "accountable to others for his religious belief". (On Liberty) Still, religious belief systems do not necessarily proliferate due to, as Mill put it, deep "intolerance" between groups. Therefore, Mill maintained the individuality associated with religious liberty did not translate into a powerful political force and the dominant class ensured its power, reflected throughout the social and political fabric, remained dominant over individual liberties outside pockets of the individual religious liberty.
Mill and Bentham agreed that if an individual's activities have the potential to bring harm to society, the community has the right to intervene for "self-protection". (On Liberty) However, this was Mill's only deviation from his principle that all other individual activities and thoughts must be free from societal interests and actions. And of course, Benthum believed that the majority, or law as dictated by the majority, could legitimately apply constraints against the individual, even if the "greatest number" are served. In addition, Mill maintained, even in the face of moral reasoning, individual actions causing harm are unjustified. This is certainly a contestable limitation since moral dilemmas by their nature are subject to differing opinions, some believing the action/activity justifiable and some not. Mill summarized that if a behavior concerned others then society has a stake in the situation, and should take action. One interesting aspect to this viewpoint, among others, is that there are a variety of opinions surrounding differing behavior; and these opinions have created categories of behavior with labels in some cases, such as victimless crimes. Other viewpoints, are classified by theorists and practitioners in several disciplines, including criminology and psychology, and these classifications lead to a variety of explanations and understanding for behaviors, as well as a variety of public policies in the creation and administration of law and public opinion. Therefore, intervention is based upon a social reality of crime and punishment, civil law construction and enforcement; and this social reality is fluid, subject to change over time and events that may have great impact (e.g. recessions, war and other military actions, or new behaviors related to technological advancement generated by discovery and invention).
4/1/09
I have run across a passage in Days that Changed the World (Hywell Williams. Quercus. 2006) that reinforces the struggle between individualism and the power of the state over the individual. Williams has written that "band(s) of protestant heretics (who) maintained that subjects had rights of conscience against divinely instituted rulers." (Page 63.) These "heretics" were responding to the Holy Roman Church and Pope Pius the V and the control it was exerting and attempting to maintain over the rights of individuals to think and act free. In this case, the struggle was between not just the dominant church-state in western and central Europe, it was a struggle between different spiritual and religious philosophies. The Protestant faction, based in northern Europe, including England, the Netherlands, and Germany (perhaps other sovereign countries to the south as well), advanced the thought that each individual had one's "right(s) to consciousness" in opposition to orthodox Catholicism's rulers and high priest (not local control) control of Europe and all political, social, and cultural life across Europe. England established the Anglican Church as the official church and political order in/of England, prompting Queen Elizabeth's excommunication in the late 16th century. The Spanish Armada's attack and invasion of England with about 100 ships and 30,000 soldiers aboard was to re-establish Catholicism in England as well as to eliminate Protestantism (Days that Changed the World). Even though the blog writer is pointing out a struggle within the same arena, religion, there may be a correlation between Mill's individualism and his rejection of "group-think and group rights over the individual and the world-changing battles between Catholicism and Protestantism in the 16th and 17th centuries. Did Mill read extensively about these factions? Or, within his lifetime, was this a part of the mindset of the English population? The writer suspects that the battles between Catholicism and Protestantism and their underlying philosophies that answer critical questions about humankind, such as Mill's, were part of the consciousness of certain segments of the English social structure; were part of its culture; and therefore, were part of the socialization process of individuals of Mill's stature. Williams notes that England's and North America's civilization development (post 16th century) is directly related to the Spanish Armada's defeat. Perhaps it was an ascension of Protestant individualism, and a decrease of mystical group-think and power from a centralized authority found in Catholicism that, among other things, formed part of English philosopher Mill's orientation. It seems that I have just scratched the surface regarding the historical nature of this issue and its complexity.
Mill displayed conflict theory underpinnings in contrast to the functionalism of Bentham.
Within the first decade of life, Mill became a prolific reader of classics and was appointed the family schoolmaster at the age of 12…an interesting concept and responsibility. It appears that while perhaps still a teenager, Mill, in concert with his father, wrote and published Elements of Political Economy. Mill was instrumental in the development of the economies of scale, opportunity cost, and comparative advantage in trade concepts. He believed in personal freedom, and emphasized its importance individually and for society. His admiration for his spouse, Harriet Taylor, may have led or influenced him to espouse the stance that irrespective of gender, all persons should be free to voice and act according to their own needs. This was critical for individual development and would provide for the betterment of a society.
It appears that he was considered at some point a philosophical radical. (I’ll have to investigate this later. Obviously, contextual information is necessary.) He might have been fluent in Greek, Latin, and French. One biography mentions that he was involved in political activities. I wonder at this point what those were. His intelligence might have worked as therapy. He suffered from depression at age 20, and historians believe he had the insight that his father’s instructional emphasis on cognition diminished his emotional development. He theorized that this deficiency may have correlated with his bout with depression. However, his capacity to analyze led him to the reading of poetry, a therapy for his malady. Mill had the grand opportunity to meet d’Eichtahl and St. Simon and other philosophers’ work, including Comte.
Mill advanced the idea that any new philosophical view needed to be incorporated gradually and slowly. Disregarding all segments of prior philosophical ideas was also dysfunctional. His father’s and Bentham’s ideas surrounding Utilitarianism would not be rejected in whole as new ideas and potential social change based in these new ideas would be integrated.
Mill and Marx appear to have a philosophical foundation similarity: they both believed in the importance of individual development and freedom, whether the person is a laborer or a person of wealth, and once again, a man or a woman. The development includes a striving for happiness. It has been noted that Mill moved away, to some degree, from his father, who did not exhibit Epicurean (one who believes in modest pleasures) tendencies at all.
Mill produced several noteworthy works, including On Liberty (1859), his System of Logic (1843), The Principles of Political Economy (1848), Utilitarianism (1861), Considerations on Representative Government (1851), The Subjection of Women (1869), and an autobiography published posthumously by his deceased spouse’s daughter in 1873, the same year of his death.
My initial readings about Mill involve language and logic, induction, and empiricism. I conclude that Mill takes the stance that in our use of logic, or how we go about our lives, we must be reasonable and not reject a form of reasoning that may lead to a conclusion that may be contestable. We must be able to infer from the present to the future, and make predictions to be safe, to be functional in a social world, and to survive. We conclude based on experience and we use experience to live effectively. It is an imperfect methodology. It includes deductive and inductive reasoning in the context of our experiences. It is fallible...but to have absolutism as a goal in this arena is unreasonable. Mill does point out that some logic, based in this reasoning, is more accurate than another. He mentions the use of superstition, leading to more inaccuracy and other dysfunction.
I, as others may, conclude that Mill espoused a form of empirical relativism. Others confirm this contention, stating Mill believed that knowledge is relative to our consciousness. Our consciousness includes inferences from our knowledge base (past events of like or similar nature). Our state of consciousness, including our beliefs, is from this inference. For example, when we visit a car dealership and open the door of a new car on the lot, we expect to smell a certain smell before we open the door and smell. If we have done this before, we are conscious of the smell prior to the present-day, about to happen, experience. Our knowledge is not from a direct experience in the present; our conscious awareness of reality is inferred from the past. The thought, or expectation is propositional, as you or I are “proposing” a reality in our thoughts. If we have not had this direct experience, but have heard about it, we have a different reality, belief, or knowledge about, and a different empirical understanding of our world, and therein is the relativity of the matter. This viewpoint also reveals the limits as well as the relativity of thought.
More later.
On Liberty (Added on 3/11/09 and 3/25/09)
On Liberty, published in 1859, is considered one of Mill's two best works in moral philosophy; the other, Utilitarianism. In Mill's words, this work focuses upon the amount of authority the nation-state can legitimately impose upon the individual. Mill mentions the present-day (mid-1800's) and future relevancy of this question in his introduction. At first glance, it is not difficult for me to imagine that he believed this to be an on-going challenge in any democracy. I remember reading another's review of Mill's entire works and a conclusion: Mill, along with Adam Smith perhaps, believed that a democracy is the preferred form of government. Beyond that, I can't go into great depth at this time to explain why Adam Smith or Mill felt this way. It appears of great importance for Mill to mention that this issue has been of great concern for more than the last two millenniums. Please note that Mill maintains this concern has divided man and that there existed in his world (I presume he was referring to a time frame somewhere between about 1760 to the time of publication of the treatise) conditions of a social, political, and economic nature that were drastically changing. He described this a period in which "civilized portions of the species" were involved in substantial progress. Almost immediately, he stipulated that when referring to liberty, freedom from the "tyranny" of political rulers should readily come to mind.
I venture that from a legal standpoint, individual rights and privileges become relevant. The legal definition of each is perhaps pertinent.
Accordingly, a right is the affirmative claim against another, including the state. A privilege, is the freedom from an affirmative claim against another, including the state.
Mill's insight that this issue, the "tyranny" of the state over individual rights and privileges, is relevant today is noteworthy. The U.S. Supreme Court , consideration of reviews, reviews, and decisions on voting rights (e.g. Indiana); firearms possession and ownership; freedom of the press issues; detainment issues (i.e. habeous corpus) such as "War on Terror" detainees); some state's same sex marriage laws;and the rights of pharmaceutical firms to refrain from providing certain information to prescription drug consumers are recent and/or current issues. The crux of the matter in these and other cases is the rights and privileges of the individual versus the rights and privileges of a governing authority. These are, of course, legal issues of grave importance, and decisions are based upon constitutional and constitutional amendment interpretations (e.g. First Amendment on Freedom of the Press, which includes the right or privilege to hear as well as speak or write.) (It's also interesting to note the frequency of the 5 to 4 split decisions in recent past, indicating the salience of these issues as well as the disagreement between members of the highest court, some of whom are no doubt considered constitutional scholars.) Mill ventures into history, describing prior eras rulers' power over his/her subjects, and the fact that the power was considered dangerous and how it could be used as a weapon against the masses and not simply against enemies. The relationship between the ruled and the ruler (e.g. Rome) was antagonistic, based upon inheritance (Are we at a different point now in the United States?) or conquest. Above all, as Mill mentioned, the ruler did not hold the position at the discretion of the people.
Updated on 3/28/09
Justified rebellion occurred only after guidelines were established limiting the rulers' power over his subject. These guidelines covered but few ruler infringements of subjects' rights. These were called "political immunities or rights" and a breach of duty on the part of the ruler in which the ruler transgressed against these immunities could cause legitimate rebellion or individualized resistance. In addition, Mill reminds us of the formulation of another branch of government via constitutional construction of a body to represent the masses. Naturally, how Europe progressed in this arena is quite different from the United States' progression (grand internal and external strife in comparison to liberation from an external kingdom). Perhaps United States leadership had an easier time of it, able to draw from a new European thought and models; free from historical international (European) and internal, historical national struggles (e.g. France attempting to change its cultural, societal, and governmental structures developed over many centuries, including a social stratification system and its ramifications in place). (Yes, indeed, the thirteen colonies did engage in a revolutionary war against Great Britain; I am quite aware.)
Trial and error within change in the midst of cultural and social life on this critical issue ("...how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control...") for extreme governmental structural alteration (i.e. from an aristocratic and Catholic clergy monarchy to an egalitarian democracy with inalienable citizen rights) produced much discord over many years in French and European society. (The French Revolutionary War of 1792-1802; The French Revolution of 1789-1799; the Napoleonic Wars; the Republican Insurrection or June Rebellion of 1832, which was an unsuccessful antimonarchist uprising of Parisian students in an attempt to reverse the monarchy of July {1830 to 1848}, a period of liberal monarchy rule of France under Louis Philippe, and was a result of the overthrow of the French Bourbon monarchy). (At the cost of 800 deaths, the republicans, or insurgents within secret societies, were crushed by the French National Guard at the Battle of Saint-Merry Cloister. The society for the Rights of Man directed the insurrection of 1832 in Paris. (wikipedia.org/wiki//june_rebellion)
Accordingly, the masses accepted the ruler only after two evolutionary provisions were "enacted". Mill notes this was a simple step within a process. First, Mill explained that humankind (the western world to Mill) altered its orientation in relationship to the almost omnipotent ruler, taking the position that he/she should become a simple "delegate", and others should become delegates for the masses' interests in the larger community. Mill's understanding of delegates of a temporary and elective nature fits into the United States' tripartite government model (except, of course with respect to the U.S. Supreme Court appointments). Just as Durkheim postulated that the deity or substitute entity within the collective consciousness of the mechanical solidarity society will reflect not only the interests of the masses, but more deeply their/its values (since the collective consciousness created it and maintains and alters it to continue to reflect its view and reinforce one another for survival sake), Mill also observed persons and societies gravitating to the view that the delegate should accurately reflect the publics' viewpoint within the context of its formally recognized and legitimized authority. Paraphrasing Mill, their (the rulers') power is the peoples' power and how and why couldn't or shouldn't the people now trust themselves?
Mill differentiated some of the essentials surrounding customs and laws. First, rules of conduct are not necessarily reflected in law. The writer advances that most are not. Rules of conduct outside the law are the "principle question in human affairs" and are decided upon differently by each society and by "the ages". Customs are axiomatically "self-evident", and "self-justifying" for each culture, based in a belief by all that we would like ourselves and others to behave in a certain manner and are based in self-interests, whether reasonable or not. Mill wrote, "All that makes existence valuable for any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people." This orientation speaks to how, as I have mentioned much earlier in another entry, the species appears to be hard-wired to take care of itself first. This writer does not understand how another might view our orientation differently; this is how we survive, even in the context of our social nature, which includes an understanding of the interdependency existence, irrespective of social structural makeup in a society. Within the context of interests, and self-interests, Mill interjects the self-interests of like-people in a society or social structure. Self-interests of the dominant class are reflected in and dominate the morality of its society. Mill observed this via how groups in a close relationship treated one another, and offered examples such as the Spartans and Helots of ancient Greece (i.e. Spartans {from Sparta, a city-state in ancient Greece} conquered and enslaved the Helots in 640 to 620 B.C.). This might be compared along one dimension to Durkheimian theorem: the division of labor reflects the morality of the participants of a specific culure at a specific time in history. We are unable to state that the division of labor causes the morality, or more specifically how groups of people treat one another within the context of their primary relationship, with its defining rules of conduct and belief system. For instance, the Spartans had to follow extremely well-described laws vis-a-vis the Helots, with punishments codified for transgressions that unjustly harmed Helots, since the Helots were actually owned by the city-state of Sparta, not an individual Spartan. Therefore, we might be able to posit that the division of labor's function, among others, was to establish and maintain a working and functional relationship between these two groups in order to achieve an umbrella objective for the society and its survival. For instance, the Helots were deployed as specialized soldiers to defend Sparta and the empire.
Updated 4/14/09
Mill's A System of Logic was published in 1843, and it is quite possibly his greatest work according to some readers of philosophy. It appears Mill stood steadfast upon the virtues of inductive reasoning, a mode based in the use of life experiences and observation within the context of empirical facts to extrapolate universal principles. (Davidson's conclusions. Davidson, Robert. Philosophies Men Live By. 1952.)
Mill parted with his father's and Bentham's Hedonism and Utilitarianism along at least one dimension: humans are capable of seeking additional pleasures than lower species are able. According to Mill, the additional pleasures include different dimensions that "beasts" are unable to experience. For instance, Mill noted humans experience "pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings, and imagination, and of the moral sentiments". Mill continued, some types of pleasures derive greater pleasure for one human being, while less pleasure for another. Therefore, some pleasures are more valuable than others. And, of course, quantity and quality are viable variables.
Mill differed with the aforementioned philosophers as well in realizing the importance of the other...Hedonism's and Utilitarianism's focus on the individual indicates a dearth of concern for others' viewpoints and needs. Mill stated, "As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." Mill cites Christianity's Jesus dictate "love they neighbor as yourself" to support an "ideal perfection of utilitarian morality". (Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government. Mill, J.S. Everyman ed. E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc. New York. 1910)
(Revised upon further research on 3/29/09.)
In 1776, within his Fragment on Government, Bentham proclaimed that law should be based in the principle of "the greatest good for the greatest number". (As somewhat of a side note, his principles on crime and punishment may be found in France's postrevolutionary Constitutent Assembly {1789} in its Declaration of the Rights of Man, as follows: "[T]he law has the right to prohitbit only actions harmful to society...The law shall inflict only such punishments as are strictly and clearly necessary...no person shall be punished except by virtue of a law enacted and promulgated previous to the crime and applicable to its terms.") (Criminology: Theories, Patterns, and Typologies. Nineth Edition. Siegel, Larry. Thomson Wadsworth. 2007.) A segment of this is incorporated in the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, protecting (de jour, perhaps not de facto) citizens from cruel and unusual punishment (note the "and", which has been interpreted by some courts as necessary for the condition to be applied accurately in a court of law). The orientation that law should be for the majority to determine and enforce law is of course consistent with a democratic orientation and Bentham's thoughts, but inconsistent with Mill's eventual position. As mentioned at a future point within this treatise, Mill was keenly aware of the power of the "ascendant" class, and how their interests are reflected in perhaps all political, social, and familial (perhaps Comte's understanding of societies) dimensions. Mill, at the very least, spoke of this influence in law, custom, relationships, and "opinion" (Mill, J.S. On Liberty. 1869.) For instance, Mill wrote, "The likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it, are thus the main thing which has practically determined the rules laid down for general observance, under the penalties of law or opinion". (Mill, J.S. On Liberty. 1869.) He noted perhaps a complacency on the part of "those who have been in advance of society in thought and feeling,have left this condition of things unassailed in principle"...even if in conflict with it. (Mill, J.S. On Liberty. 1869.) Instead, Mill claimed, these avant guard (sp) thinkers focused on "what things society should like or dislike", giving up humankind's natural law of freedom for all individuals. Mill emphasized the only exceptions he observed were those inclined to defend individual, religious thought and belief, and these defenses entailed a rancorous nature. Mill continued to define the religious arguments (probably a weak description of the heated debates) in On Liberty, and saw enough of these to contend that these ended in a stalemate. This caused each side within the religious debate to realize it had gained no ground, and "seeing that they had no chance of becoming majorities, were under the necessity of pleading to those whom they could not convert for permission to differ." Mill broadened these battles of beliefs and maintained these personified the greater societal battle between the rights of the individual and the stance of the state to control and subvert individual behaviors that were in opposition to its interests. Mill posited religious liberty and an individual's "freedom of conscience" was a right never to be voided by any entity, or that an individual was "accountable to others for his religious belief". (On Liberty) Still, religious belief systems do not necessarily proliferate due to, as Mill put it, deep "intolerance" between groups. Therefore, Mill maintained the individuality associated with religious liberty did not translate into a powerful political force and the dominant class ensured its power, reflected throughout the social and political fabric, remained dominant over individual liberties outside pockets of the individual religious liberty.
Mill and Bentham agreed that if an individual's activities have the potential to bring harm to society, the community has the right to intervene for "self-protection". (On Liberty) However, this was Mill's only deviation from his principle that all other individual activities and thoughts must be free from societal interests and actions. And of course, Benthum believed that the majority, or law as dictated by the majority, could legitimately apply constraints against the individual, even if the "greatest number" are served. In addition, Mill maintained, even in the face of moral reasoning, individual actions causing harm are unjustified. This is certainly a contestable limitation since moral dilemmas by their nature are subject to differing opinions, some believing the action/activity justifiable and some not. Mill summarized that if a behavior concerned others then society has a stake in the situation, and should take action. One interesting aspect to this viewpoint, among others, is that there are a variety of opinions surrounding differing behavior; and these opinions have created categories of behavior with labels in some cases, such as victimless crimes. Other viewpoints, are classified by theorists and practitioners in several disciplines, including criminology and psychology, and these classifications lead to a variety of explanations and understanding for behaviors, as well as a variety of public policies in the creation and administration of law and public opinion. Therefore, intervention is based upon a social reality of crime and punishment, civil law construction and enforcement; and this social reality is fluid, subject to change over time and events that may have great impact (e.g. recessions, war and other military actions, or new behaviors related to technological advancement generated by discovery and invention).
4/1/09
I have run across a passage in Days that Changed the World (Hywell Williams. Quercus. 2006) that reinforces the struggle between individualism and the power of the state over the individual. Williams has written that "band(s) of protestant heretics (who) maintained that subjects had rights of conscience against divinely instituted rulers." (Page 63.) These "heretics" were responding to the Holy Roman Church and Pope Pius the V and the control it was exerting and attempting to maintain over the rights of individuals to think and act free. In this case, the struggle was between not just the dominant church-state in western and central Europe, it was a struggle between different spiritual and religious philosophies. The Protestant faction, based in northern Europe, including England, the Netherlands, and Germany (perhaps other sovereign countries to the south as well), advanced the thought that each individual had one's "right(s) to consciousness" in opposition to orthodox Catholicism's rulers and high priest (not local control) control of Europe and all political, social, and cultural life across Europe. England established the Anglican Church as the official church and political order in/of England, prompting Queen Elizabeth's excommunication in the late 16th century. The Spanish Armada's attack and invasion of England with about 100 ships and 30,000 soldiers aboard was to re-establish Catholicism in England as well as to eliminate Protestantism (Days that Changed the World). Even though the blog writer is pointing out a struggle within the same arena, religion, there may be a correlation between Mill's individualism and his rejection of "group-think and group rights over the individual and the world-changing battles between Catholicism and Protestantism in the 16th and 17th centuries. Did Mill read extensively about these factions? Or, within his lifetime, was this a part of the mindset of the English population? The writer suspects that the battles between Catholicism and Protestantism and their underlying philosophies that answer critical questions about humankind, such as Mill's, were part of the consciousness of certain segments of the English social structure; were part of its culture; and therefore, were part of the socialization process of individuals of Mill's stature. Williams notes that England's and North America's civilization development (post 16th century) is directly related to the Spanish Armada's defeat. Perhaps it was an ascension of Protestant individualism, and a decrease of mystical group-think and power from a centralized authority found in Catholicism that, among other things, formed part of English philosopher Mill's orientation. It seems that I have just scratched the surface regarding the historical nature of this issue and its complexity.
Mill displayed conflict theory underpinnings in contrast to the functionalism of Bentham.
Within the first decade of life, Mill became a prolific reader of classics and was appointed the family schoolmaster at the age of 12…an interesting concept and responsibility. It appears that while perhaps still a teenager, Mill, in concert with his father, wrote and published Elements of Political Economy. Mill was instrumental in the development of the economies of scale, opportunity cost, and comparative advantage in trade concepts. He believed in personal freedom, and emphasized its importance individually and for society. His admiration for his spouse, Harriet Taylor, may have led or influenced him to espouse the stance that irrespective of gender, all persons should be free to voice and act according to their own needs. This was critical for individual development and would provide for the betterment of a society.
It appears that he was considered at some point a philosophical radical. (I’ll have to investigate this later. Obviously, contextual information is necessary.) He might have been fluent in Greek, Latin, and French. One biography mentions that he was involved in political activities. I wonder at this point what those were. His intelligence might have worked as therapy. He suffered from depression at age 20, and historians believe he had the insight that his father’s instructional emphasis on cognition diminished his emotional development. He theorized that this deficiency may have correlated with his bout with depression. However, his capacity to analyze led him to the reading of poetry, a therapy for his malady. Mill had the grand opportunity to meet d’Eichtahl and St. Simon and other philosophers’ work, including Comte.
Mill advanced the idea that any new philosophical view needed to be incorporated gradually and slowly. Disregarding all segments of prior philosophical ideas was also dysfunctional. His father’s and Bentham’s ideas surrounding Utilitarianism would not be rejected in whole as new ideas and potential social change based in these new ideas would be integrated.
Mill and Marx appear to have a philosophical foundation similarity: they both believed in the importance of individual development and freedom, whether the person is a laborer or a person of wealth, and once again, a man or a woman. The development includes a striving for happiness. It has been noted that Mill moved away, to some degree, from his father, who did not exhibit Epicurean (one who believes in modest pleasures) tendencies at all.
Mill produced several noteworthy works, including On Liberty (1859), his System of Logic (1843), The Principles of Political Economy (1848), Utilitarianism (1861), Considerations on Representative Government (1851), The Subjection of Women (1869), and an autobiography published posthumously by his deceased spouse’s daughter in 1873, the same year of his death.
My initial readings about Mill involve language and logic, induction, and empiricism. I conclude that Mill takes the stance that in our use of logic, or how we go about our lives, we must be reasonable and not reject a form of reasoning that may lead to a conclusion that may be contestable. We must be able to infer from the present to the future, and make predictions to be safe, to be functional in a social world, and to survive. We conclude based on experience and we use experience to live effectively. It is an imperfect methodology. It includes deductive and inductive reasoning in the context of our experiences. It is fallible...but to have absolutism as a goal in this arena is unreasonable. Mill does point out that some logic, based in this reasoning, is more accurate than another. He mentions the use of superstition, leading to more inaccuracy and other dysfunction.
I, as others may, conclude that Mill espoused a form of empirical relativism. Others confirm this contention, stating Mill believed that knowledge is relative to our consciousness. Our consciousness includes inferences from our knowledge base (past events of like or similar nature). Our state of consciousness, including our beliefs, is from this inference. For example, when we visit a car dealership and open the door of a new car on the lot, we expect to smell a certain smell before we open the door and smell. If we have done this before, we are conscious of the smell prior to the present-day, about to happen, experience. Our knowledge is not from a direct experience in the present; our conscious awareness of reality is inferred from the past. The thought, or expectation is propositional, as you or I are “proposing” a reality in our thoughts. If we have not had this direct experience, but have heard about it, we have a different reality, belief, or knowledge about, and a different empirical understanding of our world, and therein is the relativity of the matter. This viewpoint also reveals the limits as well as the relativity of thought.
More later.
On Liberty (Added on 3/11/09 and 3/25/09)
On Liberty, published in 1859, is considered one of Mill's two best works in moral philosophy; the other, Utilitarianism. In Mill's words, this work focuses upon the amount of authority the nation-state can legitimately impose upon the individual. Mill mentions the present-day (mid-1800's) and future relevancy of this question in his introduction. At first glance, it is not difficult for me to imagine that he believed this to be an on-going challenge in any democracy. I remember reading another's review of Mill's entire works and a conclusion: Mill, along with Adam Smith perhaps, believed that a democracy is the preferred form of government. Beyond that, I can't go into great depth at this time to explain why Adam Smith or Mill felt this way. It appears of great importance for Mill to mention that this issue has been of great concern for more than the last two millenniums. Please note that Mill maintains this concern has divided man and that there existed in his world (I presume he was referring to a time frame somewhere between about 1760 to the time of publication of the treatise) conditions of a social, political, and economic nature that were drastically changing. He described this a period in which "civilized portions of the species" were involved in substantial progress. Almost immediately, he stipulated that when referring to liberty, freedom from the "tyranny" of political rulers should readily come to mind.
I venture that from a legal standpoint, individual rights and privileges become relevant. The legal definition of each is perhaps pertinent.
Accordingly, a right is the affirmative claim against another, including the state. A privilege, is the freedom from an affirmative claim against another, including the state.
Mill's insight that this issue, the "tyranny" of the state over individual rights and privileges, is relevant today is noteworthy. The U.S. Supreme Court , consideration of reviews, reviews, and decisions on voting rights (e.g. Indiana); firearms possession and ownership; freedom of the press issues; detainment issues (i.e. habeous corpus) such as "War on Terror" detainees); some state's same sex marriage laws;and the rights of pharmaceutical firms to refrain from providing certain information to prescription drug consumers are recent and/or current issues. The crux of the matter in these and other cases is the rights and privileges of the individual versus the rights and privileges of a governing authority. These are, of course, legal issues of grave importance, and decisions are based upon constitutional and constitutional amendment interpretations (e.g. First Amendment on Freedom of the Press, which includes the right or privilege to hear as well as speak or write.) (It's also interesting to note the frequency of the 5 to 4 split decisions in recent past, indicating the salience of these issues as well as the disagreement between members of the highest court, some of whom are no doubt considered constitutional scholars.) Mill ventures into history, describing prior eras rulers' power over his/her subjects, and the fact that the power was considered dangerous and how it could be used as a weapon against the masses and not simply against enemies. The relationship between the ruled and the ruler (e.g. Rome) was antagonistic, based upon inheritance (Are we at a different point now in the United States?) or conquest. Above all, as Mill mentioned, the ruler did not hold the position at the discretion of the people.
Updated on 3/28/09
Justified rebellion occurred only after guidelines were established limiting the rulers' power over his subject. These guidelines covered but few ruler infringements of subjects' rights. These were called "political immunities or rights" and a breach of duty on the part of the ruler in which the ruler transgressed against these immunities could cause legitimate rebellion or individualized resistance. In addition, Mill reminds us of the formulation of another branch of government via constitutional construction of a body to represent the masses. Naturally, how Europe progressed in this arena is quite different from the United States' progression (grand internal and external strife in comparison to liberation from an external kingdom). Perhaps United States leadership had an easier time of it, able to draw from a new European thought and models; free from historical international (European) and internal, historical national struggles (e.g. France attempting to change its cultural, societal, and governmental structures developed over many centuries, including a social stratification system and its ramifications in place). (Yes, indeed, the thirteen colonies did engage in a revolutionary war against Great Britain; I am quite aware.)
Trial and error within change in the midst of cultural and social life on this critical issue ("...how to make the fitting adjustment between individual independence and social control...") for extreme governmental structural alteration (i.e. from an aristocratic and Catholic clergy monarchy to an egalitarian democracy with inalienable citizen rights) produced much discord over many years in French and European society. (The French Revolutionary War of 1792-1802; The French Revolution of 1789-1799; the Napoleonic Wars; the Republican Insurrection or June Rebellion of 1832, which was an unsuccessful antimonarchist uprising of Parisian students in an attempt to reverse the monarchy of July {1830 to 1848}, a period of liberal monarchy rule of France under Louis Philippe, and was a result of the overthrow of the French Bourbon monarchy). (At the cost of 800 deaths, the republicans, or insurgents within secret societies, were crushed by the French National Guard at the Battle of Saint-Merry Cloister. The society for the Rights of Man directed the insurrection of 1832 in Paris. (wikipedia.org/wiki//june_rebellion)
Accordingly, the masses accepted the ruler only after two evolutionary provisions were "enacted". Mill notes this was a simple step within a process. First, Mill explained that humankind (the western world to Mill) altered its orientation in relationship to the almost omnipotent ruler, taking the position that he/she should become a simple "delegate", and others should become delegates for the masses' interests in the larger community. Mill's understanding of delegates of a temporary and elective nature fits into the United States' tripartite government model (except, of course with respect to the U.S. Supreme Court appointments). Just as Durkheim postulated that the deity or substitute entity within the collective consciousness of the mechanical solidarity society will reflect not only the interests of the masses, but more deeply their/its values (since the collective consciousness created it and maintains and alters it to continue to reflect its view and reinforce one another for survival sake), Mill also observed persons and societies gravitating to the view that the delegate should accurately reflect the publics' viewpoint within the context of its formally recognized and legitimized authority. Paraphrasing Mill, their (the rulers') power is the peoples' power and how and why couldn't or shouldn't the people now trust themselves?
Mill differentiated some of the essentials surrounding customs and laws. First, rules of conduct are not necessarily reflected in law. The writer advances that most are not. Rules of conduct outside the law are the "principle question in human affairs" and are decided upon differently by each society and by "the ages". Customs are axiomatically "self-evident", and "self-justifying" for each culture, based in a belief by all that we would like ourselves and others to behave in a certain manner and are based in self-interests, whether reasonable or not. Mill wrote, "All that makes existence valuable for any one, depends on the enforcement of restraints upon the actions of other people." This orientation speaks to how, as I have mentioned much earlier in another entry, the species appears to be hard-wired to take care of itself first. This writer does not understand how another might view our orientation differently; this is how we survive, even in the context of our social nature, which includes an understanding of the interdependency existence, irrespective of social structural makeup in a society. Within the context of interests, and self-interests, Mill interjects the self-interests of like-people in a society or social structure. Self-interests of the dominant class are reflected in and dominate the morality of its society. Mill observed this via how groups in a close relationship treated one another, and offered examples such as the Spartans and Helots of ancient Greece (i.e. Spartans {from Sparta, a city-state in ancient Greece} conquered and enslaved the Helots in 640 to 620 B.C.). This might be compared along one dimension to Durkheimian theorem: the division of labor reflects the morality of the participants of a specific culure at a specific time in history. We are unable to state that the division of labor causes the morality, or more specifically how groups of people treat one another within the context of their primary relationship, with its defining rules of conduct and belief system. For instance, the Spartans had to follow extremely well-described laws vis-a-vis the Helots, with punishments codified for transgressions that unjustly harmed Helots, since the Helots were actually owned by the city-state of Sparta, not an individual Spartan. Therefore, we might be able to posit that the division of labor's function, among others, was to establish and maintain a working and functional relationship between these two groups in order to achieve an umbrella objective for the society and its survival. For instance, the Helots were deployed as specialized soldiers to defend Sparta and the empire.
Updated 4/14/09
Mill's A System of Logic was published in 1843, and it is quite possibly his greatest work according to some readers of philosophy. It appears Mill stood steadfast upon the virtues of inductive reasoning, a mode based in the use of life experiences and observation within the context of empirical facts to extrapolate universal principles. (Davidson's conclusions. Davidson, Robert. Philosophies Men Live By. 1952.)
Mill parted with his father's and Bentham's Hedonism and Utilitarianism along at least one dimension: humans are capable of seeking additional pleasures than lower species are able. According to Mill, the additional pleasures include different dimensions that "beasts" are unable to experience. For instance, Mill noted humans experience "pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings, and imagination, and of the moral sentiments". Mill continued, some types of pleasures derive greater pleasure for one human being, while less pleasure for another. Therefore, some pleasures are more valuable than others. And, of course, quantity and quality are viable variables.
Mill differed with the aforementioned philosophers as well in realizing the importance of the other...Hedonism's and Utilitarianism's focus on the individual indicates a dearth of concern for others' viewpoints and needs. Mill stated, "As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator." Mill cites Christianity's Jesus dictate "love they neighbor as yourself" to support an "ideal perfection of utilitarian morality". (Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government. Mill, J.S. Everyman ed. E.P. Dutton and Co., Inc. New York. 1910)
John Stuart Mill, 1806-1873, was a British philosopher, a political economist, civil servant and Member of Parliament (MP). It has been stated that he may have been the most influential philosophical thinker of the 19th century in the English speaking world. His father, James Mill, a philosopher as well, along with Jeremy Bentham, educated Mill. It was James Mill’s intent to educate his son in accordance with Utilitarian thought, a Bentham construct. Upon Bentham’s and his death, James Mill expected his son to carry on the cause for Utilitarianism. With this in mind, Mill’s educational experience was rigorous and he was intentionally kept away from other children outside the immediate family.
Within the first decade of life, Mill became a prolific reader of classics and was appointed the family schoolmaster at the age of 12…an Interesting concept and responsibility. It appears that while perhaps still a teenager, Mill, in concert with his father, wrote and published Elements of Political Economy. Mill gravitated away from Benthamite thought and was instrumental in the development of the economies of scale, opportunity cost, and comparative advantage in trade concepts.
He believed in personal freedom, and emphasized its importance individually and for society. His admiration for his spouse, Harriet Taylor, may have led or influenced him to espouse the stance that irrespective of gender, all persons should be free to voice and act according to their own needs. This was critical for individual development and would provide for the betterment of a society.
It appears that he was considered at some point a philosophical radical. (I’ll have to investigate this later. Obviously, contextual information is necessary.) He might have been fluent in Greek, Latin, and French. One biography mentions that he was involved in political activities. I wonder at this point what those were. His intelligence might have worked as therapy. He suffered from depression at age 20, and historians believe he had the insight that his father’s instructional emphasis on cognitive diminished his not emotional development. He related this dearth in emotional development to his bout with depression. However, his capacity to analyze led him to the reading of poetry, a remedy for his malady. Mill had the grand opportunity to meet d’Eichtahl and St. Simon and other philosophers’ work, including Comte.
Mill advanced the idea that any new philosophical view needed to be incorporated gradually and slowly. Disregarding all segments of prior philosophical ideas was also dysfunctional. His father’s and Bentham’s ideas surrounding Utilitarianism would not be rejected in whole as new ideas and potential social change based in these new ideas would be integrated.
Mill and Marx appear to have a philosophical foundation similarity: they both believed in the importance of individual development and freedom, whether the person is a laborer or a person of wealth, and once again, a man or a woman. The development includes happiness. It has been noted that Mill moved away, to some degree, from his father, who did not exhibit Epicurean (one who believes in modest pleasures) tendencies at all.
Mill produced several noteworthy works, including On Liberty (1859), his System of Logic (1843), The Principles of Political Economy (1848), Utilitarianism (1861), Considerations on Representative Government (1851), The Subjection of Women (1869), and an autobiography published posthumously by his deceased spouse’s daughter in 1873, the same year of his death.
My initial readings about Mill involve language and logic, induction, and empiricism. I conclude that Mill takes the stance that in our use of logic, or how we go about our lives, we must be reasonable and not reject a form of reasoning that may lead to a conclusion that may be contestable. We must be able to infer from the present to the future, and make predictions to be safe, to be function in a social world, and to survive. We conclude based on experience and we use experience to live effectively. It is imperfect. It is an imperfect method. It includes deductive and inductive reasoning in the context of our experiences. It is fallible. But to have absolutism as a goal in this arena is unreasonable. Mill does point out that some logic, based in this reasoning, is more accurate than another. He mentions the use of superstition, leading to more inaccuracy and other dysfunction.
I, as others may, will conclude that Mill espoused a form of empirical relativism. Others confirm this contention, stating Mill believed that knowledge is relative to our consciousness. Our consciousness includes inferences from our knowledge base (past events of like or similar nature). Our state of consciousness, including our beliefs, is from this inference. For example, when we visit a car dealership and open the door of a new car on the lot, we expect to smell a certain smell before we open the door and smell. If we have done this before, we are conscious of the smell prior to the present-day, about to happen, experience. Our knowledge is not from a direct experience in the present; our conscious awareness of reality is inferred from the past. The thought, or expectation is propositional, as you or I are “proposing” a reality in our thoughts. If we have not had this direct experience, but have heard about it, we have a different reality, belief, or knowledge about, and a different empirical understanding of our world, and therein is the relativity of the matter. This viewpoint also reveals the limits as well as the relativity of thought.
More later.
Within the first decade of life, Mill became a prolific reader of classics and was appointed the family schoolmaster at the age of 12…an Interesting concept and responsibility. It appears that while perhaps still a teenager, Mill, in concert with his father, wrote and published Elements of Political Economy. Mill gravitated away from Benthamite thought and was instrumental in the development of the economies of scale, opportunity cost, and comparative advantage in trade concepts.
He believed in personal freedom, and emphasized its importance individually and for society. His admiration for his spouse, Harriet Taylor, may have led or influenced him to espouse the stance that irrespective of gender, all persons should be free to voice and act according to their own needs. This was critical for individual development and would provide for the betterment of a society.
It appears that he was considered at some point a philosophical radical. (I’ll have to investigate this later. Obviously, contextual information is necessary.) He might have been fluent in Greek, Latin, and French. One biography mentions that he was involved in political activities. I wonder at this point what those were. His intelligence might have worked as therapy. He suffered from depression at age 20, and historians believe he had the insight that his father’s instructional emphasis on cognitive diminished his not emotional development. He related this dearth in emotional development to his bout with depression. However, his capacity to analyze led him to the reading of poetry, a remedy for his malady. Mill had the grand opportunity to meet d’Eichtahl and St. Simon and other philosophers’ work, including Comte.
Mill advanced the idea that any new philosophical view needed to be incorporated gradually and slowly. Disregarding all segments of prior philosophical ideas was also dysfunctional. His father’s and Bentham’s ideas surrounding Utilitarianism would not be rejected in whole as new ideas and potential social change based in these new ideas would be integrated.
Mill and Marx appear to have a philosophical foundation similarity: they both believed in the importance of individual development and freedom, whether the person is a laborer or a person of wealth, and once again, a man or a woman. The development includes happiness. It has been noted that Mill moved away, to some degree, from his father, who did not exhibit Epicurean (one who believes in modest pleasures) tendencies at all.
Mill produced several noteworthy works, including On Liberty (1859), his System of Logic (1843), The Principles of Political Economy (1848), Utilitarianism (1861), Considerations on Representative Government (1851), The Subjection of Women (1869), and an autobiography published posthumously by his deceased spouse’s daughter in 1873, the same year of his death.
My initial readings about Mill involve language and logic, induction, and empiricism. I conclude that Mill takes the stance that in our use of logic, or how we go about our lives, we must be reasonable and not reject a form of reasoning that may lead to a conclusion that may be contestable. We must be able to infer from the present to the future, and make predictions to be safe, to be function in a social world, and to survive. We conclude based on experience and we use experience to live effectively. It is imperfect. It is an imperfect method. It includes deductive and inductive reasoning in the context of our experiences. It is fallible. But to have absolutism as a goal in this arena is unreasonable. Mill does point out that some logic, based in this reasoning, is more accurate than another. He mentions the use of superstition, leading to more inaccuracy and other dysfunction.
I, as others may, will conclude that Mill espoused a form of empirical relativism. Others confirm this contention, stating Mill believed that knowledge is relative to our consciousness. Our consciousness includes inferences from our knowledge base (past events of like or similar nature). Our state of consciousness, including our beliefs, is from this inference. For example, when we visit a car dealership and open the door of a new car on the lot, we expect to smell a certain smell before we open the door and smell. If we have done this before, we are conscious of the smell prior to the present-day, about to happen, experience. Our knowledge is not from a direct experience in the present; our conscious awareness of reality is inferred from the past. The thought, or expectation is propositional, as you or I are “proposing” a reality in our thoughts. If we have not had this direct experience, but have heard about it, we have a different reality, belief, or knowledge about, and a different empirical understanding of our world, and therein is the relativity of the matter. This viewpoint also reveals the limits as well as the relativity of thought.
More later.
Monday, February 16, 2009
Herbert Spencer: Imperialists and Slavery
Well, well, well...what do we have here...an accurate depiction of the Bush administration (43) from 100 years beforehand? Perhaps we do. As stated by Spencer, an imperialistic nation actually places itself in peril and subjugates itself as it invades and subjugates another. The imperialist destroys, or at least damages, its own precepts as it involves itself in shortsighted activities. Spencer might take the position that we have handcuffed ourselves with our own shackles with our reckless behavior during the Bush administration. Most believe it is quite reasonable to expect that We will maintain a significant present in Iraq for many years, in one of several capacities over time. Spencer points out that an imperialist nation decrees itself superior to its victims, and in the case of Iraq, he might ask who the victims were, are and will be over the years. This is a tacit result, out of many, for the two nationalities and their representatives, regardless of their positions within each society. It is quite possible that many Americans don't believe that Iraqis are capable and Americans had to come to their rescue. Spencer would perhaps ask: Have we cheapened our culture as a result? Have we become more narrow as a result? Have we all become pawns for the king/emperor, who made the decision to war/invade independent of outside, conflicting information and with deceit? How many hours of each day of work in the past seven years have each of us worked that were allocated to the Iraq war? What percentage of each workers' wage has gone for this purpose? How else have our lives changed as a result of a predominantly unilateral and strike first orientation and evaluate honestly (for the people of the nation state); as well as with true and adequate analysis? Is/was the invasion for not just capitalism, but individual capitalists with cozy relationships within government, the defense industry, and correllary industries with common directorates/leadership? Was the balance of power within the federal governmental structure so schewed that a one-sided viewpoint with centralized power steamrolled any other viewpoint? And finally, Spencer might ask how we, the citizen, "enslaved" by the state's power to control our lives, for we all were working for the government and its actions, could have prevented the most recent imperialistic as well the next advance in name-only of self-preservation?
No time to review at this point. Must part.
No time to review at this point. Must part.
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Newsweek magazine dated February 16, 2009
Check it out. Entitled: We Are All Socialists Now: The Perils and Promise of the New Era of Big Government.
I have to read. Bye.
I have to read. Bye.
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
Marx's Communist Manifesto
Questions we might ask ourselves:
1. How can we expect that any society will not have hierarchy, class divisions, and power differentials?
2. And, if these (i.e. class divisions) are tempered by cultural aspects that control or direct thought and behavior, how can we expect a revolt by the masses?
3. I understand Marx's argument or belief that capitalists destroy, or are constantly causing their own crises through competition and expansion for survival. Theoretically, but I would like to see/hear an example of how the proletariat responded, step by step, to create massive change. And, I would like to see/hear an analysis, describing events and their causal relationships, once again, step by step, of the deterioration of a society's beurgeois class. What happened? What were their "mistakes"? How did they respond? What factors precipitated each event?
4. I need to discuss how the bourgeoisie "supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education". It makes sense, but further discussion will solidify this process.
5. Are home loans a way that capitalists appease the proletariat? (Just popped into my head.)
We all know that a "man's home is his castle".
6. We do live according to the interests of the ruling class; I have felt this for many years. The "system" convinces us to "get ahead", plan for future challenges; but if we play by the rules of the game, the game is "fixed" so that one can get ahead only so much. The struggle is day-to-day and it continues until death. The ruling class (and I have said this for years of the military) calculates what it can take and what it needs to give back to stay in its position and have its interests reflected in law, civil and criminal, and the enforcement of the law; within the context of federal agency guidance and guidelines that dictate what all must follow, individually or within the workforce/workplace; and perpetuates itself through the media. Do you remember an AT & T's commercial from about 1982? "The system is the solution" was the theme. It struck me then, and it strikes me now.
7. In communistic society, how does the present dominate the past?
8. The bourgeoisie is involved in unconscious destruction of itself. How did humankind "get in this fix"?
9. What socialistic steps have we had to take to keep our U.S. economic ship afloat, if any?
10. Altering the economic system of the world as Marx suggests in the CM...how can this be realistically fathomed? I advance the thought that the socialization of most in the first world precludes this from happening, irrespective of class. Most accept the system as is and the most prominent nation's leader/administration is simply and obviously tweaking the system, the most one might reasonably expect. Inequality will continue to be addressed within a present-day system approach.
11. What is the importance of a nation's military? (Looking for perspective here!) What can a military force really do in today's world? Seems pretty limited to me as the world has changed drastically since WW II, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War in the 1990s. Somebody recently asked if the military was a closed system. This is part of my point...the U.S. military is and is not, depending upon political forces in the environment at the moment.
1. How can we expect that any society will not have hierarchy, class divisions, and power differentials?
2. And, if these (i.e. class divisions) are tempered by cultural aspects that control or direct thought and behavior, how can we expect a revolt by the masses?
3. I understand Marx's argument or belief that capitalists destroy, or are constantly causing their own crises through competition and expansion for survival. Theoretically, but I would like to see/hear an example of how the proletariat responded, step by step, to create massive change. And, I would like to see/hear an analysis, describing events and their causal relationships, once again, step by step, of the deterioration of a society's beurgeois class. What happened? What were their "mistakes"? How did they respond? What factors precipitated each event?
4. I need to discuss how the bourgeoisie "supplies the proletariat with its own elements of political and general education". It makes sense, but further discussion will solidify this process.
5. Are home loans a way that capitalists appease the proletariat? (Just popped into my head.)
We all know that a "man's home is his castle".
6. We do live according to the interests of the ruling class; I have felt this for many years. The "system" convinces us to "get ahead", plan for future challenges; but if we play by the rules of the game, the game is "fixed" so that one can get ahead only so much. The struggle is day-to-day and it continues until death. The ruling class (and I have said this for years of the military) calculates what it can take and what it needs to give back to stay in its position and have its interests reflected in law, civil and criminal, and the enforcement of the law; within the context of federal agency guidance and guidelines that dictate what all must follow, individually or within the workforce/workplace; and perpetuates itself through the media. Do you remember an AT & T's commercial from about 1982? "The system is the solution" was the theme. It struck me then, and it strikes me now.
7. In communistic society, how does the present dominate the past?
8. The bourgeoisie is involved in unconscious destruction of itself. How did humankind "get in this fix"?
9. What socialistic steps have we had to take to keep our U.S. economic ship afloat, if any?
10. Altering the economic system of the world as Marx suggests in the CM...how can this be realistically fathomed? I advance the thought that the socialization of most in the first world precludes this from happening, irrespective of class. Most accept the system as is and the most prominent nation's leader/administration is simply and obviously tweaking the system, the most one might reasonably expect. Inequality will continue to be addressed within a present-day system approach.
11. What is the importance of a nation's military? (Looking for perspective here!) What can a military force really do in today's world? Seems pretty limited to me as the world has changed drastically since WW II, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War in the 1990s. Somebody recently asked if the military was a closed system. This is part of my point...the U.S. military is and is not, depending upon political forces in the environment at the moment.
Monday, February 2, 2009
Marx and Social Power - The Effect of Mechanization
In The Grundrisse, once again, Marx continues to describe how the labourer becomes less and less a human being in the industrial setting, as he delineates the psychological and social impact of machinery in the workplace. The labourer's social power has inexorably diminished as machinery has taken over not just physical aspects of each job, but most cognitive aspects, thereby distancing the worker from the final product. I must submit that this is a process that I can accurately label a "degradation" process, in which the worker's contribution is virtually destroyed or of such minusculer importance that, of course, the worker can be readily replaced without production interruption. The workers' social power continues to decrease as objectification increases; the worker and her/his counterparts' psyche die; the machinery lives; and the work and product is that of the machinery now, and not the living human being. Marx now defines the worker as an accessory of the machinery; devoid of any social function or power in its life-activity. The capacity to think, to develop, and to process information becomes inconsequential as technological advancements subsume living labours' social needs.
Social Power - Marx's view
Marx's viewpoint appears to follow this line of thought:
Commodities are capital (partially). Labour is a commodity. As a commodity, labour has an exchange value. A labourer, without capital, must sell his labour to sustain life. But, what is the labourer selling? His life activity, hs very being. His life. He must sell his life in exchange as a means of subsistence. The self is sold when all labour has is itself, and must sell self to capitalists to live.
"Any amount of commodities when multiplied" become greater capital, and greater social power over those who have limited social power, labourers. As capital increases, greater social power is derived for those with capital, the number of labourers needed increases to sustain and produce more capital, competition increases, which in turn, once again, increases the number of labourers needed and concomitantly decreases the labourer's social power as the division of labor and the number of labourers increases, and the means of production changes and becomes more sophisticated. Commodities (including labour and labourers), held by the capitalists, become a social power in and of themselves. A social power held by few over many, a result of the exchange of "living labour power".
Must we be what others want us to be when we labor? Do we always give our social power away? Or, if one has a passion for their work, does that person "sell her/himself" to the capitalist? Marx would we all do and must, even if we have a great passion for our work, in the sense that we have given ourselves or created for ourselves something greater and beyond us, and decreased or eliminated ourselves as human beings, since we now live, and engage in a life-activity no longer ours, for it is work for an abstraction or mission that we have created to minimize our "sale of self" and the pain (i.e. sense of alienation from self) we may feel when we periodically think of our "sale of self".
Commodities are capital (partially). Labour is a commodity. As a commodity, labour has an exchange value. A labourer, without capital, must sell his labour to sustain life. But, what is the labourer selling? His life activity, hs very being. His life. He must sell his life in exchange as a means of subsistence. The self is sold when all labour has is itself, and must sell self to capitalists to live.
"Any amount of commodities when multiplied" become greater capital, and greater social power over those who have limited social power, labourers. As capital increases, greater social power is derived for those with capital, the number of labourers needed increases to sustain and produce more capital, competition increases, which in turn, once again, increases the number of labourers needed and concomitantly decreases the labourer's social power as the division of labor and the number of labourers increases, and the means of production changes and becomes more sophisticated. Commodities (including labour and labourers), held by the capitalists, become a social power in and of themselves. A social power held by few over many, a result of the exchange of "living labour power".
Must we be what others want us to be when we labor? Do we always give our social power away? Or, if one has a passion for their work, does that person "sell her/himself" to the capitalist? Marx would we all do and must, even if we have a great passion for our work, in the sense that we have given ourselves or created for ourselves something greater and beyond us, and decreased or eliminated ourselves as human beings, since we now live, and engage in a life-activity no longer ours, for it is work for an abstraction or mission that we have created to minimize our "sale of self" and the pain (i.e. sense of alienation from self) we may feel when we periodically think of our "sale of self".
Sunday, February 1, 2009
The Nature of Social Power
It appears that explaining the nature of social power as a concept irrespective of a certain culture, society, bureaucracy, small group, or individual might be a starting point. The question itself requires an extensive answer, and no doubt any answer will not adequately cover all aspects of the concept.
Social power, of course, is constructed by persons to establish order and predictability in social relationships, interactions, and expectations. An individual's social status within a social system is associated with power, and defines the degree of power each participant or player maintains at a given time within the system. Roles played by each participant in each circumstance in the social system have a impact on power. Roles can change as a person moves from one environment to another, and therefore, power differentials change, as players change in each circumstance. Informal and formal social power must also be considered as individuals are either placed in or may achieve specific social statuses within systems, both large and small.
Social power can dictate people's access to opportunity and capacity to participate in certain aspects of life, ensuring little social and economic movement. Economic and political systems, along with an individual need to perhaps remain in a one-up-man ship relationship with perceived subordinates, through informal and formal identifiable attributes (ascribed and/or achieved), are in play via a variety of forces in which social power is primary. We all learn the importance of social power in the roles we play, and we make decisions whether we want to remain in the group at hand and attempt to change or maintain our social position and therefore social powerl; engage in denial or perhaps fight to gain more power; alter some attribute/s we possess to change position vis-a-vis others; find peace within ourselves with other positive aspect to the group and the greater structure that is defining our social reality and therefore our identity and potentially self and social concept; leave the group, employer, community, or other defining and potentially limiting entity; create another group with similar objectives but without the inequalities and the resultant power differentials within the group; or attempt to organize a movement to change the greater social structure and essentially topple the power elite within the group or social construct.
It is noteworthy that social power is a product of and is exerted toward or against others within a socially stratified society with inequality and unequal treatment between classes defined by race, sex, education, and many other traits that have a fluid quality, including the present-day, informal or perhaps formal discrimination of overweight persons. Even legitimately recognized power, which includes coercive power to carry out objectives, instituted by governmental processes (e.g. legislation or judicial decision), care accepted at a certain level by the populace even if the it has a de facto unjust result. Most of the United States social power apparatus/construct is accepted, and therefore the class statuses and power differentials are accepted due to a focus on individual achievement and achieved status (and therefore the belief that each person is capable of moving to or from a certain socio-economic status), and that the system has a more fluid nature to it for each person in comparison to societies that emphasize ascribed status and familial lineage to define status and social power. I have met and worked in more than one profession with individuals who readily accept others' acqisition of material items, even in extravigant (i.e. conspicuous consumption) quantities and qualities. Quotes included, "You deserve it, you earned it." These were persons with a sporadic work history, little formal education, prison incarcerations of moderate duration (i.e. two years), a family history of prison incarcerations, substance abuse histories, and other stressors not as commonly experienced in middle class society.
The following paragraph is a summary of Karl Marx's explanation or understanding of social power found in "WageLabour and Capital". First, he maintains that "instruments of labour", or the class of labourers, is a segment or part of capital. (This, in itself, explains how the reader can understandably conclude that labor has little social power.) These instruments of labour, along with raw materials and means of subsistence of all kinds, produce raw materials. The worker, an instrument of labour, becomes capital only when the worker assumes the role of a laborer vis-a-vis a capitalist. Outside of this relationship, the human is not part of capital. However, within the production process, the worker produces through cooperation of some sort, developing relationships in order to produce. Each change in the instruments of production changes social relations between labourers as they have altered activities. Material means of production change over time (e.g. industrially applied technological advancements), defining social relations of production within the work environment and a society as a whole. When this phenomenon (means of production change) occurs it creates a definitive point in history and establishes a new and distinctive society with unique social relationships and production relationships. Accordingly, capital is realized through production and accumulated via labour, in the context of social conditions and circumstances, and according to specific social relations. It is this social context that produces capital. Capital also has exchange value, and the exchange value in a society, giving capital a social nature. Marx has stipulated that a product is a commodity with an exchange value or a price in a social and economic sense. Commodities, products with exchange value, are part of capital and are exchanged and produced via living labour power, and therefore, those with only their labour to offer in exchange for meeting their needs to sustain life have but little social power while those with capital have great social power. Commodities become capital, by virtue of their exchange value, and this capital a form of social power, and this social power subordinates those who must produce the commodities to exist.
Social power, of course, is constructed by persons to establish order and predictability in social relationships, interactions, and expectations. An individual's social status within a social system is associated with power, and defines the degree of power each participant or player maintains at a given time within the system. Roles played by each participant in each circumstance in the social system have a impact on power. Roles can change as a person moves from one environment to another, and therefore, power differentials change, as players change in each circumstance. Informal and formal social power must also be considered as individuals are either placed in or may achieve specific social statuses within systems, both large and small.
Social power can dictate people's access to opportunity and capacity to participate in certain aspects of life, ensuring little social and economic movement. Economic and political systems, along with an individual need to perhaps remain in a one-up-man ship relationship with perceived subordinates, through informal and formal identifiable attributes (ascribed and/or achieved), are in play via a variety of forces in which social power is primary. We all learn the importance of social power in the roles we play, and we make decisions whether we want to remain in the group at hand and attempt to change or maintain our social position and therefore social powerl; engage in denial or perhaps fight to gain more power; alter some attribute/s we possess to change position vis-a-vis others; find peace within ourselves with other positive aspect to the group and the greater structure that is defining our social reality and therefore our identity and potentially self and social concept; leave the group, employer, community, or other defining and potentially limiting entity; create another group with similar objectives but without the inequalities and the resultant power differentials within the group; or attempt to organize a movement to change the greater social structure and essentially topple the power elite within the group or social construct.
It is noteworthy that social power is a product of and is exerted toward or against others within a socially stratified society with inequality and unequal treatment between classes defined by race, sex, education, and many other traits that have a fluid quality, including the present-day, informal or perhaps formal discrimination of overweight persons. Even legitimately recognized power, which includes coercive power to carry out objectives, instituted by governmental processes (e.g. legislation or judicial decision), care accepted at a certain level by the populace even if the it has a de facto unjust result. Most of the United States social power apparatus/construct is accepted, and therefore the class statuses and power differentials are accepted due to a focus on individual achievement and achieved status (and therefore the belief that each person is capable of moving to or from a certain socio-economic status), and that the system has a more fluid nature to it for each person in comparison to societies that emphasize ascribed status and familial lineage to define status and social power. I have met and worked in more than one profession with individuals who readily accept others' acqisition of material items, even in extravigant (i.e. conspicuous consumption) quantities and qualities. Quotes included, "You deserve it, you earned it." These were persons with a sporadic work history, little formal education, prison incarcerations of moderate duration (i.e. two years), a family history of prison incarcerations, substance abuse histories, and other stressors not as commonly experienced in middle class society.
The following paragraph is a summary of Karl Marx's explanation or understanding of social power found in "WageLabour and Capital". First, he maintains that "instruments of labour", or the class of labourers, is a segment or part of capital. (This, in itself, explains how the reader can understandably conclude that labor has little social power.) These instruments of labour, along with raw materials and means of subsistence of all kinds, produce raw materials. The worker, an instrument of labour, becomes capital only when the worker assumes the role of a laborer vis-a-vis a capitalist. Outside of this relationship, the human is not part of capital. However, within the production process, the worker produces through cooperation of some sort, developing relationships in order to produce. Each change in the instruments of production changes social relations between labourers as they have altered activities. Material means of production change over time (e.g. industrially applied technological advancements), defining social relations of production within the work environment and a society as a whole. When this phenomenon (means of production change) occurs it creates a definitive point in history and establishes a new and distinctive society with unique social relationships and production relationships. Accordingly, capital is realized through production and accumulated via labour, in the context of social conditions and circumstances, and according to specific social relations. It is this social context that produces capital. Capital also has exchange value, and the exchange value in a society, giving capital a social nature. Marx has stipulated that a product is a commodity with an exchange value or a price in a social and economic sense. Commodities, products with exchange value, are part of capital and are exchanged and produced via living labour power, and therefore, those with only their labour to offer in exchange for meeting their needs to sustain life have but little social power while those with capital have great social power. Commodities become capital, by virtue of their exchange value, and this capital a form of social power, and this social power subordinates those who must produce the commodities to exist.
Darwin, Charles - Point of Interest
2009: "This year marks the 150th anniversary of the most incendiary book in the history of science, and coincidentally, the 200th birthday of the mild-mannered Englishman who wrote it." (National Geographic, February 2009) The book, commonly called On the Origin of the Species is actually entitled On the Origin of the Speciesby Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, and made its presence known some 23 years after Darwin's travels to the Galapagos Islands from 1831 to 1836.
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